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THOMAS E. DEWEY AND EARL WARREN: THm RISE OF
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY URBAN PROSECUTOR
LAWRENCE FLEISCHER*
INTRODUCTION
The study of the American urban prosecutor, a key political-legal officer
who carries the immense power of "prosecutorial discretion," has yet to
attract serious historical research. A review of the published literature
suggests the first crucial period of development occurred during the
Jacksonian period when the office broke free of its traditional administrative
role as the adjunct of the court. During this period the local urban
prosecutor became an elected official.1 This unmoored the office from the
anchor of the judiciary and set it sailing into the realm of politics. Essential-
ly, this set the standard throughout the nineteenth and the early part of the
twentieth centuries of an office beholden to the electorate in the most intimate
political sense, and established the office as the keystone of the criminal
justice system. The decision to prosecute and administer the process of
justice rested with an elected political official, one independent from the
courts. In short, the American public prosecutor replaced the British model
of private prosecution. No longer could an individual act on his own to
initiate a criminal prosecution. The decision to prosecute became a "public"
decision.
In this most delicate decision-making process the prosecutor wore two hats:
professional and political. With the rise of abuse of political influence most
* B.A., City College of New York, Summa cum laude 1973; J.D., American University
School of Law, 1976; LL.M., N.Y.U. School of Law, 1980. Adjunct Professor of Law and
Legal History, N.Y.U. Liberal Studies Department.
I wish to thank Gretchen Feltes and Professor Eugene Gressman for a careful reading of this
manuscript. I also want to thank the N.Y.U. Law School Legal History Colloquium for
thoughtful suggestions given during two presentations. This article is dedicated to my mother,
Sylvia Fleischer, and the memory of my father, David Fleischer.
1. See generally A. STEINBERG, THE TRANSFORMATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PHILADEL-
PHIA, 1860-1880 (1989) (one of the few studies of the transition from private to public
prosecution in nineteenth century America). See also J.E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECU-
TOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1980).
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closely associated with the name of Tammany2 in the late nineteenth century,
the feeling among the reformist Mugwump3 population was that prosecutors
had become corrupted by their political roles and had ceased to administer
fair and impartial justice. This view was later shared by the Progressive
reformers of the twentieth century.' While the Progressives protested this
distorted collusion between politics and public law, the widespread permanent
sanitizing process they hoped for never materialized. Instead, ad hoc reform
measures were used as "quick fixes" to remedy an intolerable situation.
These measures often came in the form of temporary crime commissions,
which attempted to circumvent the local prosecutor with a dramatic show of
citizen power. The commissions usually centered around investigations of
flourishing vice rings which were tolerated by the local prosecutor or
sustained through bribery by local police. Once the commissions ran their
course, the status quo of vice usually returned.
By the early 1930s, a new national spirit of reform swept the country. The
forces of local reform centered on the anti-vice philosophy and united with
a progressive model of professionalization of the criminal justice system.
These reforms helped change the office of the urban prosecutor from the
accepted politically corrupt model. Moralistic progressivism and modern
professionalism united and coalesced in the careers of two men, Thomas E.
Dewey and Earl Warren. These two figures, arriving on the East Coast and
West Coast at roughly the same time, seized upon the historical moment of
reform and reshaped the role of the urban prosecutor.
By shifting the emphasis away from patronage politics and towards an
office based on meritocracy and dedication to police professionalization,
Dewey and Warren created the new model of local prosecutor which governs
to this day. These two state politicians were dedicated to making their
offices models of reform. They introduced the ideas, now second nature, of
"career professionals," who did not practice private law. Their offices were
staffed with talented graduates of major law schools. Dewey and Warren
2. Tammany Hall was the name and physical location of regular Democratic headquarters
in Manhattan. The name "Tammany" became synonymous with corruption and Boss Tweed.
"Tammany" came to universally symbolize corrupt union machine politics in America. See
generally G. MYERS, THE HISTORY OF TAMMANY HALL (1901).
3. Mugwumps were late nineteenth century urban reformers who believed in a non-partisan
political elite and were in favor of large scale civil service reform and the secret ballot. They
favored an elite class of governance. See generally G. MCFARLAND, MUGWUMPS, MORALS AND
PoLITIcs 1884-1920 (1975).
4. The Progressive movement was, roughly speaking, the successor to the Mugwump
movement. It shared its goal of one elite professional government, but also was more broad-
minded in its approach to the lower class electorate. It encompassed non-protestant groups and
was more committed to a broader program of social reform than its progenitors in the nineteenth
century. Notable Progressive reformers included politician Woodrow Wilson and journalist
Jacob Riss. See generally R. HOFsTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION AND THE
MEN WHO MADE IT (1948) (the classic study dealing with the links and differences between the
Mugvumps and Progressives). For an excellent study of more recent vintage which attempts
to synthesize Hofstadter with more recent scholarship, see A. DAWLEY, STRUGGLES FOR
JUSTICE, SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LIBERAL STATE (1991).
[Vol. 28
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sought prosecutors who would not give in to impulses of corruption, but
rather would envision themselves as zealous guardians of the public interest.
Similarly, Dewey and Warren sought to professionalize the local police by
manacling them to the rule of law, assuring they were trained in forensic
science, and ensuring that they were as dedicated as the prosecutor to
incorruptibility. By force of their skill and personalities, Dewey and Warren
embodied and defined the phrase "Mr. District Attorney." This term entered
the vernacular of Americans, symbolizing the new model of independence
and power dedicated to the public good in the fight against organized crime.
However, by creating this model of a "few good men" independently
dedicated to the public welfare, both Dewey and Warren failed to adequately
envision the dark side of so much unfettered power in the name of the public
good. By not questioning the elective-model and the potential abuse of
prosecutorial discretion in the name of crime control, these "good men"
sometimes replaced the model of corruption with a new model which threat-
ened the emerging concern over civil liberties. Their rigid adherence to
catching mobsters at all costs raised serious questions about individual
privacy and abuse of state power, particularly in the newly developed area
of electronic crime control.
An acute observer of this time, Herbert Wechsler,5 questioned this unchal-
lenged prosecutorial power and articulated a model of restraint which
satisfied the legitimate needs of crime control and, at the same time,
recognized the equally important checks on state power.
Dewey and Warren faced the dilemma caused by the duality of the office
of public prosecutor as a political forum and professional expert modern law
enforcer. For both, it seemed that by eliminating the shadows of abuse of
political influence epitomized by Tammany and the "third degree" tactics
used by criminal justice officers, they had completed their job. Each failed
to question the inherent political nature of the office and the effect this would
have on prosecutorial discretion. Political issues of another sort also were
raised, coalescing around the ability to use the office with untempered zeal.
The notion of the "public good" was embodied by the man in office. There
was no need for any judicial or legislative checks. The definitive check was
the ballot box.
This Article focuses on the failure of both Dewey and Warren to recognize
this problem of unrestrained prosecutorial discretion and authority, causing
them to edge toward a police state mentality. A philosophy emerged that the
good prosecutor could do no wrong. By adhering to this notion of total
independence, they failed to see that there were limits to zealousness in the
5. Harlan Fisk Stone Emeritus Professor of Constitutional Law at Columbia University.
Wechsler authored one of the earliest and classic case books on criminal law, H. ,ECHSIER,
CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS ADMINISTRATION (1940). He was also A.L.I. Model Penal Code
Reporter from 1951-1962. See also Radzinowiez, Herbert Wechsler's Role in the Development
of American Criminal Law and Penal Policy, 69 VA. L. REV. 1 (1983) (for an assessment of
his seminal impact on criminal justice in America).
1991]
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legitimate battle against crime. Contemporaries like Weschsler, New York
Governor Herbert Lehman,6 and California Governor Culbert Olson
criticized this threat to civil liberties.
It is an irony of history that as a Justice, Earl Warren realized the
limitations of his earlier actions and sought to counter professional prosecuto-
rial zealotry with constitutional judicial oversight. In so doing, he revolu-
tionized the local criminal justice system and placed significant judicial
checks on the model he had earlier embraced. The exclusionary rule and
Miranda became the new companions to the prosecutor.
Dewey never seemed to question his model and criticized the Warren Court
for intervening and hamstringing what he saw as the legitimate needs of law
enforcement and the public good against crime. In the post-Warren era, it
now seems that the Warren Court's model of judicial checks on the police
and prosecutor may be a historical aberration.
It appears the Dewey model is beginning to return in the Rehnquist era.
The essential checks on prosecutorial excess will again be the theme of a few
good men, scrutiny by self-policing, and the ballot box. The brief genera-
tional Prague spring of judicially imposed reform may be on its way out and
the essential dichotomy of prosecutor as politician and professional will
return with the prosecutor as his own master.
I. THE RISE OF THE URBAN PROSECUTOR
The urban public prosecutor's office in the first half of the twentieth
century was a stepping stone to state and national power. Henry L. Stimson,
United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York was perhaps
the earliest Progressive prosecutor, combining honesty, professionalism, and
efficiency. Stimson, appointed by Theodore Roosevelt in 1905, was the
progenitor of what would become the twentieth century noble ideal of
independence and incorruptibility.7 He was the first United States Attorney
6. Herbert H. Lehman was the Reformist Democratic Governor who followed Franklin
Delano Roosevelt as Governor of New York. Lehman's reforms in New York are sometimes
referred to as the "Little New Deal." Lehman was a member of the famous investment family.
His brother, Irving Lehman, sat on the New York State Court of Appeals. These two figures
represented the progressive forces in New York during the Depression. Both were outspoken
civil libertarians. Though Herbert Lehman appointed Dewey as special prosecutor, he criticized
Dewey for his perceived prosecutorial zeal and failure to recognize basic civil liberties needs,
including the necessity for an exclusionary rule in New York. Lehman later became a United
States Senator. See generally A. NEVINS, HERBERT H. LEHMAN AND His ERA (1963); and R.
INGAuLS, HERBERT H. LEHMAN AND NEW YoRK's LITrLE NEW DEAL (1975).
Lehman's opposite number in California was Culbert L. Olson, the Democratic Governor of
California from 1938 until 1942. Olson's regime, while fully supportive of Roosevelt, practiced
a more passive agenda of reform than Lehman. Olson had greater enemies, was less congenial
a personality, was not part of a greater state Democratic tradition, and had the misfortune of
coming against Earl Warren in 1942. He lost because of all these reasons and Warren's ability
to label him a "pinko," soft on crime and communism. For an excellent study of Olson's term,
see R. BURKE, OLSON'S NEW DEAL FOR CALIFORNIA (1953).
7. M. MAYER, EMORY BUCKNER 24-25 (1968).
[Vol. 28
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to staff his office with full-time lawyers who were not allowed to perform
any private work. These lawyers were hired on merit and were not political
appointments. 8 Through a system of networking with his old friend at
Harvard Law School, James Barr Ames, Stimson attracted the likes of Emory
Buckner, Thomas Thatcher, and Felix Frankfurter to his staff.9 The
combination of full-time prosecutor and apolitical staffing created a new
standard of effective prosecutoral organization.1" As a result of his success,
Stimson went on to national prominence as Secretary of War under Wilson
and Roosevelt.
Stimson's actual impact on the urban crime scene was not directly due to
the jurisdictional limitations of the U.S. Attorney and federal crime
jurisdiction in general. The model he created, however, was strong and
enduring even influencing the likes of Rudolph Giuliani. 1 Influenced by
Stimson's methods and the possibilities of Progressive ideas of reform (which
emphasized the danger of the politicalization of the District Attorney's office
and its close link to Tammany), Republican Charles Whitman became
District Attorney in New York County in 1910.12 He prepared to do battle
with the Tammany tiger and the pervasive corruption within the New York
City Police Department which had lasted and triumphed even over Police
Commissioner Theodore Roosevelt's tenure from May 1895 until April 1897.
The police system in New York was so corrupt that Whitman hired an
outside force of Pinkerton's to keep tabs on his own squad. 3
During Whitman's term the emphasis was on eliminating the police
corruption aligned with illegal gambling interests. 4 This effort culminated
in the conviction and execution of Lt. Charles Becker, Chief of the New
York vice squad, for the murder of gambler "Beansy" Rosenthal in the
notorious "tenderloin" district. 5  Becker silenced Rosenthal when he
learned Rosenthal was going to make a deal in exchange for leniency on his
illegal gambling charges. Rosenthal planned to inform on and testify against
Becker about payoffs from gambling in return for protection against vice
raids. 6 The sensational trial, conviction, and execution of Becker, known
8. Id.
9. G. HODGSON, THE COLONEL, HENRY SIMPSON'S LIFE AND ,VARS, 1867-1952, at 61
(1990).
10. H. STIMSON & M. BUNDY, ON ACTIVE SERVICE IN PEACE AND WAR 15 (1947).
11. Former United States Attorney for the Southern District of New York. Speech by
Rudolph Guiliani, attended by author, N.Y.U. Law School, March 1987, in which Guiliani
made reference to Stihson as a model for his thinking about how to run a modem prosecutor's
office. Guiliani specifically said he read the Morison biography before taking office.
12. A. LOGAN, AGAINSTTHE EVIDENCE, THE BECKER-ROSENTHALAFFAIR (1970) (containing
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as the "Becker-Rosenthal" affair, catapulted Whitman to the governorship.17
Whitman's success showed the political rewards a successful crusading
prosecutor could make. There was even speculation about a possible
presidential nomination.'"
Whitman's success became the model of the Tammany bashing and anti-
police corruption crusading district attorney who cleansed the corrupt local
stables and used the office to gain higher position. This became a twentieth
century hallmark. Implicit in this tradition was the identification of the urban
Democratic party with venality. The urban District Attorney sought to break
the yoke of Tammany on police department and public morals.
II. THE RISE OF DEWEY AND WARREN
Whitman's short reign failed to make any real dent in the power of
Tammany in New York. Tammany continued to control the District
Attorney's office. By the 1920s, aided by the Prohibition Amendment, urban
crime had taken on an even more sinister and organized form in the public
perception. With the repeal of the Eighteenth Amendment in 1932, the
organized crime apparatus and rampant lawlessness which accompanied the
failed Prohibition enforcement policy did not wither away on the vine.' 9
Instead it transmuted itself into other criminal enterprises such as gambling
and loansharking. The unholy alliance with corrupt politicians continued.
In both Alameda County, California and in New York City, the District
Attorney's office remained largely passive in regard to corruption directly
involved with the Democratic machine. The District Attorney incumbents
were largely products of the machines or at the very least saw no inconsisten-
cy in using their offices for political means.
As a result of the post-prohibition challenge and the reforms brought on the
national scene by Roosevelt, the time was ripe for a resurgence of reform on
the local level. Thomas E. Dewey and Earl Warren seized the opportunity.
But this round of reform was more sophisticated than either Whitman or
Stimson would imagine. The goals of Dewey and Warren were the creation
of modern, professional district attorneys and police forces and the ousting
17. Id.
18. Logan presents a strong case that Becker may not have been guilty and Whitman
motivated by political ambition may have ignored exculpatory evidence and railroaded him to
his death. When Becker's sentence was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in New York,
Becker's pregnant wife pled for a commutation to the now Governor Whitman who refused not
only the pardon but even to appoint an independent commission. A. LOGAN, supra note 12.
19. The Volstead Act was the progenitor to the National Prohibition Amendment. For an
excellent analysis of the legal consequences of prohibition see LAW, ALCOHOL, AND ORDER,
PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL PROHIBITION (D. Kyvig, ed. 1985). In particular, for an excellent
discussion of the problems of enforcement see H. NELLI, AMERICAN SYNDICATE CRIME: A
LEGACY OF PROHIBITION 123, 137 (1985).
[Vol. 28
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of corrupt political machines from the urban scene.' Both Dewey and
Warren sought to create meritocracy-based district attorney offices staffed by
lawyers independent of politics."
Dewey and Warren also trained scientific minded police forces. These
forces did not resort to the more extreme illegal tactics then in use such as
the heinous police interrogation tactics collectively known as the "third
degree." This was part of their commitment to depoliticize the criminal
justice system. In 1931, the Wickersham Commission published a sensation-
al report written by the National Commission on Law Observance and
Enforcement.' The report was co-authored by a gallery of prominent
progressive lawyers including Zachariah Chaffee, Jr., Walter H. Pollack, and
Carl S. Stein. The report detailed a nationwide pattern of both physical and
psychological abuse of individuals in police custody. For example, it
described and criticized the common practice of holding defendants
incommunicado from defense attorneys and deliberately delaying their
arraignments.' The report referred to an earlier "Third Degree" report in
New York County carried out by the Association of City Ban in 1928 by
Charles Whitman, Emory Buckner, and George Medalie condemning these
practices as illegal forms of psychological and physical torture that should be
condemned by all reform minded men.
The report's nationwide examination of urban criminal justice systems had
a tremendous national impact. The report not only denounced police
practices as illegal, unfair, and unconstitutional, it also noted that existing
police practices encouraged lazy and inefficient police work which kept local
police forces deprofessionalized, thus making the slide to corruption much
easier. The report contained recommendations and urged increased judicial
and legislative scrutiny of these illegal practices and impliedly chastised both
local and federal courts for not carefully scrutinizing involuntary coerced
confessions.
The report used People v. Doran' as a prominent example of judicial
laziness in policing the police. In Doran, the New York Court of Appeals
affirmed a conviction for murder despite strong and extensive evidence that
the defendant had been arrested without a warrant, held incommunicado for
several days before being arraigned, and most importantly, beaten in a police
gymnasium with boxing gloves by his interrogators. In a sharply worded
20. NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FIFTY-NINTH ANNUAL
MEETING 451-55 (1936); see also L. BAKER, MIRANDA: CRIME, LAW AND POLITICS 117 (1983)
(provides insights into Warren's views as a district attorney).
21. See G. WHITE, EARL WARREN A PUBuc LIFE 30-33 (1982)
22. NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND ENFORCEMENT. REPORT ON
LAWLESSNESS IN LAW ENFORCEMENT (1931) (known popularly as the Wickersham Report)
[hereinafter the Wickersham Report].
23. Id. at 84-85.
24. Id. at 87.
25. 246 N.Y 409, 159 N.E. 379 (1927).
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dissent, in which Judge Cardozo concurred, Judge Irving Lehman, while
conceding probable guilt, strongly condemned judicial tolerance of third
degree practices:
If Doran is guilty he can be convicted before another jury without
introducing in evidence his alleged confession. The courts may
not approve the punishment even of the guilty, if guilt is estab-
lished by means which are destructive of the fundamental rights
of the accused. We have long ago abolished the rack and
thumbscrew as a means of extorting confession; the courts cannot
sanction the introduction of the boxing glove in their place.'
It was in this atmosphere of heightened concern with criminal procedure
and civil liberties, as it related to physical and prolonged psychological abuse
by the police, that Dewey and Warren entered the picture in their roles as
chief prosecutor. The reformed-minded progressive bar was certainly "crime
control" oriented. But as indicated by the writings of Medalie, Whitman, and
others, when faced with weak unprofessional police forces the progressive
bar sided with "due process" forces.27
The Third Degree detailed a litany of abuse and influenced the Supreme
Court's activity regarding police procedures at the trial level. The Court's
scrutiny of these practices became more intensive in the 1930s. As Otis
Stephens has pointed out, the level and frequency of Supreme Court
intervention on police procedures increased.' Despite the countervailing
tugs of federalism and the traditional deference to local enforcement, the
Supreme Court was more inclined to actively intervene to correct illegal
police interrogation. This occurred most notably in 1936 in Brown v.
Mississippi.9 The Court extended its "fair trial" due process analysis to
confessions extracted by physical torture and declared them inadmissible
under the Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause? The Court thus
devoted itself to eliminating the more egregious coercive techniques used by
state and local police. The local police and district attorney were still
allowed to develop and use their own techniques of interrogation. The
professionalism of local law enforcement jurisdictions was regarded still as
generally lower than their federal counterparts.3' However no federal
26. Id. at 436-37, 159 N.E. at 389.
27. H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968) (defines "crime control"
advocates as emphasizing society's right versus individual defendant's rights while "due process"
advocates emphasize individual rights versus state rights to keep the individuals secure from
crime).
28. 0. STEPHENS, THE SUPREME COURT AND CONFESSIONS OF GUILT (1973).
29. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). See R. CORTNER, A "SCOTTSBORO- CASE IN MISSISSIPPI: THE
SUPREME COURT AND BROWN V. MISSISSIPPI (1986) (an excellent analysis of Brown v.
Mississippi).
30. Brown, 297 U.S. at 287.
31. 0. STEPHENS, supra note 28, at 32.
[Vol. 28
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catechism of police technique and rules existed. As a result of the Wicker-
sham report and Brown v. Mississippi, the more egregious third degree
techniques faded. Instead, the police turned to more sophisticated psycholog-
ical manuals such as the text by Professor Fred Inbau on Lie Detectors and
Confessions.'
The psychological interrogation manual replaced the rubber hose. Of
course, a more sophisticated police force was needed to use those psychologi-
cal techniques as well as new breakthroughs in forensic scientific evidence.
Warren and Dewey, in order to professionalize and expand the cooperation
between police and prosecutors, attended numerous police conferences, wrote
in police journals, and handpicked their district attorney squads. They
selected men they considered to be professionals, independent of local police
forces, and able to handle sophisticated investigations involving crime and
corruption.33 Both rejected the third degree and embraced the new psycho-
logical techniques as necessary tactics in the fight against crime.'
In parallel fashion, the practice of merit hiring of assistant district attorneys
replaced the earlier practice of political hiring. Both men selected bright
men from quality law schools. By creating models of a "few good men,"
they believed they could reform the system and maintain its integrity while
continuing the important battle against crime, particularly organized crime
and corrupt politics.
Opposed to the Warren and Dewey philosophy were people such as Irving
Lehman of the New York Court of Appeals, his brother, New York
Governor Herbert Lehman, Herbert Wechsler, and Edward Weinfeld.35
These men were less sanguine about a prosecutor's ability to control police
on their own. They believed in the heightened judicial scrutiny of the due
process model. They also believed in a legislative model which would allow
crime fighting to continue within the context of respect for civil liberties and
control by statute. The conflict between the two sides was about the outer
limit of the necessity for reform and whether it would come from prosecu-
tors' self-policing or from courts and statutes. The debate was whether
prosecutorial independence and efficiency was being compromised by outside
judicial or legislative meddling. With Lehman, and the Roosevelt-Labor
National Coalition, the Democratic party became identified with something
more than the negative brush of Tammany. It became positively associated
with a closer identification with due process and civil liberties. The
Republican party became associated more closely with a narrow law and
order crime control model. The Republicans were equally committed to
32. F. INBAU, LIE DETECTION AND CRIMINAL INTERROGATION (lst ed. 1942).
33. S. Moore, Young Tom Dewey: The Prosecutor and the Politician 96-97 (1982)
(unpublished Ph.D dissertation in the author's possession).
34. Id. at 97; G. WHITE, supra note 21, at 27.
35. See infra note 181.
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reform but felt the law and order apparatus would be compromised by
judicial and legislative interference along exclusionary rule lines.
The .dilemma which faced both Dewey and Warren was how to create a
model of an effective professional office, sensitive to civil liberties, and at
that same time responsive to the siren call of crime control which so
dominated the age in both its organized crime, anti-corruption, and
communist labor manifestations.
III. DEWEY AS PROSECUTOR
A. Dewey's Rise to Power
Thomas E. Dewey was born into a comfortable middle class family in
Ohio.36 His father was a small town newspaper editor. 7 His grandfather
was a founder of the Republican party in Ohio. 8
Dewey's initial foray into the law was passionless. He began his law
studies at the University of Michigan Law School 9 and transferred to
Columbia Law School when he moved to New York.' His main reason for
coming to New York was not to practice law or fight crime but to be a
classical singer." He sang at churches and a synagogue to earn money and
gain experience.42 An aggravated case of strained vocal cords, laryngitis,
and limited talent ended his singing career.43 It was only then, realizing
that he would never be Nelson Eddy's rival, that he turned to the law as
serious pursuit."
Dewey began his professional career in 1931 as an Assistant U.S. Attorney
in the Southern District of New York in the office of Republican U.S.
Attorney George Medalie.4 Medalie, who became Dewey's life-long
mentor and idol, was also a graduate of Columbia Law School and a
Republican progressive.' Dewey rose to the level of Acting U.S. Attorney
when Roosevelt was elected in 1932, and Medalie left office early.4
While still in the U.S. Attorney's office, Dewey handled numerous
organized crime and political corruption cases including the tax evasion
36. R. SITH, THOMAs E. DEWEY AND HIs TIMES 27 (1982).
37. Id. at 57, 66.
38. Id. at 54.
39. Id. at 81.
40. Id. at 85.
41. Id. at 82-86.
42. Id. at 86.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 113.
46. Id. at Ill.
47. Id. at 141.
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investigation of the notorious Waxey Gordon." Dewey was among those
prosecutors who perfected the technique of fighting organized crime figures
through the soft-underbelly of tax evasion.49 Dewey left office when
Roosevelt appointed Martin Conboy, a Democrat, as United States Attor-
ney. 50
Dewey came of age on the local scene following the most extensive
investigation of municipal corruption in the city's history, the Seabury
investigation. Judge Samuel Seabury, appointed by the Governor, had
uncovered layers of bribery and corruption among New York City's
magistrates, police, and Mayor Jimmy Walker.51 By the end of the investi-
gation in 1933, Mayor Walker and numerous judges had resigned.52 While
the focus of the Seabury investigation was the magistrate's court, inevitably,
attention also focused on the New York County District Attorney's office.
For the twenty years since the elevation of Charles Whitman to the
governorship, that office had been a Tammany stronghold, seething with
corruption and incompetence. Historian Alan Abner Block sums up the state
of affairs in New York County's criminal justice system circa 1935:
New York's criminal justice bureaucracies were politicized: the
various positions such as judge, court officer, Assistant District
Attorney, District Attorney, etc., were the rewards of successful
politics. Most offices in the criminal justice bureaucracies were
part of the patronage of municipal politicians; the authority of the
bureaucracies were subordinate to the power of politicians and
their patrons and clients who included organized criminals. One
of the results, therefore, was the protection of organized crimi-
nals .... 53
48. Irving Wexler alias Waxey Gordon (1888-1952) was a key figure in the New York
underworld of the 1920s and early 1930s. He was involved with drugs, prostitution, liquor, and
labor racketeering. In one of his early successful prosecutions as an assistant U.S. Attorney in
1930 Dewey convicted Gordon of income tax evasion as a result of his bootlegging activities.
See ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN CRIME 290-91 (C. Sifakis ed. 1982). See also R. SMITH,
supra note 36, at 108, 130-140.
49. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 146-76.
50. Id. at 141.
51. See generally H. MITGANG, THE MAN WHO RODE THE TIGER: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF
JUDGE SAMUEL SEABURY (1963).
52. Id. One Judge, Joseph Force Crater, got in a taxi on West 45th Street and was apparently
driven into the state of oblivion, never to be heard from again. This book provides a superb
description and analysis of New York City's judicial-criminal scene in the early thirties and the
Seabury investigation.
53. A. Block, Lepke, Kid Twist and the Combination: Organized Crime in New York City,
1930-1944 (1975) (unpublished Ph.D. thesis available from author) [hereafter Organized Crime].
See also A. BLOCK, EAST SIDE-WEST SIDE: ORGANIZING CRIME IN NEW YORK, 1930-1950
(1983) (perhaps the single best study of organized crime and government). See also S. Moore,
Young Tom Dewey: The Prosecutor and the Politician (1982) (unpublished dissertation in
author's possession). An interesting recent work on why the federal government failed to
intervene locally on the urban war on organized crime through the use of Hoover's revitalized
F.B.I. in the 1930s suggests that Roosevelt was concerned not only by traditional concerns about
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The immediate impetus for Dewey's arrival on the Manhattan crime scene
was the so-called "Runaway" Grand Jury, headed by its foreman, New York
real estate broker Lee Thompson Smith.' Starting in May 1935, the Smith
Grand Jury investigated policy operations, bail bonds, and municipal vice in
general. Eventually it began withholding evidence from the then New York
County District Attorney William Dodge and his staff.55 The Grand Jury
had become so dissatisfied with the course and conduct of the District
Attorney's investigation that at one point they locked Dodge's Assistant
District Attorneys out of the Grand Jury room and proceeded to interview
witnesses themselves.' Allying themselves with Smith's bold actions,
numerous civic groups petitioned Governor Herbert Lehman to appoint a
special Deputy District Attorney to supersede Dodge in corruption investiga-
tions.57 In June 1935, Lehman ordered Dodge to appoint a special prosecu-
tor from a list of Dodge's choosing.5" When Dodge refused to submit a
list, Lehman submitted his own and made it clear to Dodge that if he did not
accept a candidate from the Lehman list, he, Lehman, would supersede
Dodge. 9
The candidates recommended to Lehman included the son of the Chief
Judge Charles Evans Hughes, Jr., and George Z. Medalie. All of these
candidates were former U.S. Attorneys.' None of the candidates agreed
to serve but they collectively issued a joint statement, on Medalie's
recommendation, that Dewey be appointed.6" Dewey was also nominated
by the Association of the Bar of the City of New York.62 Dewey had
conducted disciplinary hearings on behalf of the bar involving corrupt judges
and had appeared as prosecutor before the Appellate Division in disbarment
proceedings.' At the end of June 1935, Lehman named Dewey as Special
Prosecutor for New York County. 4
federalism in regard to the use of a national police force, but also this: "Prosecuting urban
racketeers meant, in many cases, challenging prestigious urban labor unions and political
machines with New York's own Tammany Hall heading the list, these organizations had
contributed heavily to the Roosevelt victory in 1932 and they would be needed again in 1936."
Hence, Roosevelt and J. Edgar Hoover directed themselves to less politically sensitive anti-
gangsterism in America rather than the labor-Tammany urban crime of New York. This
interesting thesis is offered in Claire Bond Potter, Guarding the Crossroads: The F.B.I.'s War
on Crime in the 1930s (1990) (unpublished dissertation in the author's possession).
54. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 147-48.
55. Id. at 148.
56. Id. at 148. See also S. Moore, supra note 33, at 80.
57. Id. at 149.
58. id. at 148.
59. Id. at 148.
60. Id. at 148.
61. Id. at 149.
62. A. Block, supra note 53, at 122.
63. S. Moore, supra note 33, at 74.
64. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 150.
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The significance of Dewey's appointment as Special Prosecutor was
immediately realized by the organized crime community. One of the most
interesting stories in this regard concerns the alleged efforts of mobster
"Dutch" Schultz (who referred to Dewey as his "nemesis") to have Dewey
assassinated. Apparently, Shultz held a grudge against Dewey for Dewey's
participation in a prosecution against Shultz for income tax evasion. Shultz
became obsessed with the idea that Dewey had to be "rubbed out." Schultz
presented his plan to a committee composed of Meyer Lansky, Louis
Buchalater, Johnny Torro, Albert Anastasia, Lucky Luciano, and Joe
Adonis.' The committee jointly turned down the plan as much too danger-
ous.' The gangsters feared a tremendous outcry for retribution from an
aroused public should the killing succeed.67 Stubbornly, Schultz decided to
implement his plan without outside help.s In response, organized crime
allegedly killed him for his efforts.'
Upon assuming office, Dewey in a remarkable public relations coup, was
able to deliver what amounted to an inauguration address over the radio.'
It was probably one of the earliest uses of the medium by a District
Attorney. Dewey's vibrant baritone most likely added an even more
dramatic effect. Dewey was to return to the airwaves on strategic occasions
later in his career. Apparently, he was fully aware of the powerful effect of
this new medium.7' Since Dewey rarely gave press conferences (in marked
contrast to some future District Attorneys), the radio addresses were reserved
for dramatic policy statements.
Dewey's maiden speech was entitled "How to Fight the Racketeer." The
talk was so well received that it was printed in the monthly journal Vital
Speeches.2 The editors penned the following introduction: "In spite of the
local character of this address, the editors present it in the belief that it will
aid other parts of the country in the vigorous handling of this type of
situation."'7
Dewey began his address by stating his general belief that a prosecutor
should do most of his talking in a courtroom. While Dewey for the most
part adhered to this credo, he was not above utilizing the radio for campaign
publicity. He went on to describe the scope of his executive mandate which
65. Id. at 171.
66. B. TuRIus & S. FEDER, MURDER, INC. 109-19 (1951).
67. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 171.
68. Id. at 170.
69. B. TURKIS & S. FEDER, supra note 66, at 109-19. See also S. Fox, BLOOD AND POWER:
ORGANIZED CRIME IN TWNTE-TH CENTURY AMERICA (1989)
70. Dewey, How to Fight the Racketeer, 23 VITAL SPEECHES 731 (Aug. 12, 1935)
[hereinafter VITAL SPEECHES].
71. S. Moore, supra note 33, at 160. He meticulously planned his radio addresses to the
point of making several disc runs through prior to the formal speech to assure himself that his
intonation and style was at its zenith.
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included eliminating "any and all acts of racketeering and vice, any and all
acts of organized crime or any other crime" and "any connection between
such acts and any law enforcement officials in the County of New York."'
Dewey emphasized, however, that his was not to be an ordinary vice
campaign in the traditional Mugwump style. The object of his office would
not be the suppression of ordinary prostitution, lottery, or gambling. Rather,
the investigation would concentrate on vice only as it existed in organized
form. 75 He was concerned not with the street gambler or pimp but with the
wholesaler of women's bodies and the professional criminals who allegedly
poured millions of dollars in illegal profits into the coffers of criminal
banks.76 This war chest of loot could too easily facilitate the pervasive
corruption and bribing of public officials.
Dewey stated the raison d'etre of his office would be to fight modem
racketeering.' The racketeer was the quintessential "bad guy" euphemism
of the 1930s. Dewey brandished it in all his major addresses like a verbal
blow-torch to instill fear and concern in the public in order to get aid and
cooperation in his investigations against crime. For Dewey, racketeering was
the:
business of successful intimidation for the purpose of regularly
extorting money. It is conducted by organized gangs of low-grade
outlaws who lack either the courage or the intelligence to earn an
honest living. They succeed only so long as they can prey upon
the fear or weakness of disorganized or timid victims. They fail
and run to cover when business and the public, awakened to their
own strength, stand up and fight.7"
This was a pervasive evil which infiltrated the major industries and labor
unions of New York. The checklist of infiltrated industries included flour,
chicken, poultry, vegetables, and fish. From all these industries, the
racketeers demanded and received their pound of flesh. Dewey was
particularly troubled by dummy trade associations organized by racketeers.
Dewey, sensitive to New York City's pro-labor tradition and organized
working class, was careful to not evoke the old conservative adage of
organized labor as a criminal conspiracy per se.79 He explicitly announced
his support of organized labor. In fact, a Dewey assistant was commissioned
to write an article that labor itself was innocent of such crimes and was a
74. Id. at731.
75. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 159.
76. VITAL SPEECHES, supra note 70, at 732.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 159
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vital force in America.' The article contained no discussion of political
crimes associated with labor and communists. Instead, it pointed to
ineffective law enforcement as the real problem.8
Dewey concluded his address with an appeal for information from the
public. He emphasized the secrecy of his investigation, the secrecy of the
grand jury, and his desire to prosecute to the hilt. The concept of racketeer-
ing as the greatest threat to a free society became a dominant recurring theme
running throughout Dewey's tenure. Whether organized crime reached the
huge proportions of which Dewey warned is not as important as Dewey's
belief that it had and the public's perception that it threatened to strangle
Manhattan.
There is some objective evidence that the 1930s did see a growth in the
sophistication of organized crime and new areas of criminality. For
example, a recent study of the history of loansharking in American cities
concluded that loansharking became much more sophisticated, organized, and
violent in New York in the early 1930s.' While pre-1900 loansharking
operated just a shade towards the wrong side of the tracks and had little, if
any, violence involved, racket loansharking apparently first became extensive
in New York City during the early 1930s.1 Dewey's investigations as
special prosecutor were the first extensive investigations in this area and
received national attention through a series of articles in The New York
Tmes.' The specific catalyst for the Dewey probe was an incident in late
1934 where a 20-year old clerk was beaten by collection agents for failure
to pay a $6 interest payment on a $10 loan.' Upon assuming office,
Dewey began a nine-month investigation culminating, in October of 1935,
in 27 arrests for extortion." Dewey continued to make arrests of small
loan agencies which operated without licenses and charged usurious rates.
Dewey attempted to link the operations to the Schultz and Buchalter gangs,
but never produced such evidence in court.'
To cope with this more organized and sophisticated crime, Dewey
streamlined the District Attorney's office and set the style and pace for
decades to follow.88 Dewey was the first District Attorney to employ a full-
time accountant to aid in a complex fraud investigation. Most significantly,
80. Note, Legislation: Legal Implications of Labor Racketeering, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 993
(1937).
81. The author concluded that "[racketeering is only a minor element of the labor movement
and abuses in unions is only a minor instance of the crime of racketeering." Id. at 1004.
82. See Hailer & Alviti, Loansharking in American Cities: Historical Analysis of a Marginal
Enterprise, 21 AM. J. LEGAL IST. 125, 142 (1977).
83. Id. at 155.
84. Id. at 146.
85. Id. at 142.
86. Id.
87. Id. But see A. Block, supra note 53, for a discussion of the perception versus the reality
of crime in the 1930s.
88. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 155. See also S. Moore, supra note 33, at 95.
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Dewey employed a superb young and dynamic staff of attorneys. Tradition-
ally, the office had been staffed by political hacks who achieved their jobs
through party patronage, Dewey ended much of this. He fired all but one
of the Assistant District Attorneys under the former regime and added a staff
of young lawyers with impeccable academic credentials. 9 Most came from
either Columbia or Harvard Law Schools. In addition, Dewey hired a very
high percentage of minority, including Jewish, attorneys. Because of the
prejudices of the times, these attorneys would have had difficulty obtaining
prestigious legal positions if Dewey had not given them the initial opportuni-
ty and exposure of working in the District Attorney's office.
"Dewey's men" are remarkable for the later fame and prestige they would
receive. They were the equivalent of the famous West Point Class of 1915
who were said to have had "the stars fall upon them."' "Dewey's men"
included two Chief Judges of the New York Court of Appeals (Breitel and
Fuld), a Federal Circuit Court Judge, Murray Gurfein, the New York
County District Attorney, Frank Hogan, Secretary of State William Rodgers,
and numerous sitting judges, including Judge Lawrence Walsh (Special
Irangate Prosecutor).9' Dewey was also the first to integrate the District
Attorney's staff by hiring a female African-American, Eunice Carter.'
Dewey's impact on the criminal justice system was not limited to
investigations alone. He was consciously striving to be a law reformer. For
example, under the aegis of Stanley Fuld, the head of Dewey's indictment
bureau, Dewey's office simplified the common law indictment form to
accommodate modern crime.' The Fuld-Dewey indictments eliminated
excess verbiage and recast the elements of offenses in simple language. The
Harvard Law Review pronounced the new indictments a "significant step
toward more rational criminal procedure."'
By far the most significant piece of legislation Dewey was involved in was
the promulgation of section 278 and section 279 of the old New York
criminal code providing for joinder of multiple offenses under a single
89. Id.
90. Book World, Washington Post, Feb. 27, 1983, at I (review of autobiography of General
of the Army Omar N. Bradley by John Keegan).
91. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 244.
92. Id. at 245.
93. Note, Streamlining the Indictment, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 122 (1939). The anonymous writer
stated: "Although less spectacular than its successful drives against organized crime, the recent
revision and simplification of its indictment by the District Attorney's office in New York
County promises to be a significant step towards a more rational criminal procedure." The note
also noted Stanley Fuld's role in this drafting. Fuld who was chief of the indictment bureau and
later of the appeals bureau went on to become Chief Judge of the New York Court of Appeals
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indictment.95 Section 279 provided that a person charged with crimes
involving two or more acts or transactions constituting crimes or offenses,
could be tried under a single indictment.' Furthermore, under the new law
the court could impose separate sentences for each offense if convictions
were obtained.' This was a significant innovation over the former New
York State law which made it extremely difficult to join separate offenses.
The effect on prosecution of "racket cases" is evident. If Dewey had to
proceed under the former law, his big rackets investigations would have been
hampered by the necessity for trying several cases, thus preventing the jury
from seeing the "big picture," not to mention the time and expense of
additional trials.
Dewey lobbied so strongly for the passage of this liberal joinder law that
the indictment-joinder law became know as the "Dewey law."" Dewey
summed up his belief in the absolute necessity of these changes in order to
combat modern urban crime.
Today crime is syndicated and organized. A new type of criminal
exists who leaves his hirelings and front men the actual offenses
and rarely commits an overt act himself. The only way in which
the major criminal can be punished is by connecting him to those
various layers of subordinates and those related by separate crimes
on his behalf....
As the law now stands, there is a procedural straightjacket which
prohibits the trial of these offenders together (except in conspira-
cy, which is a mere misdemeanor), though they all coordinate the
acts of the master through his subordinates. Although the
organization is conceived and functions to prey upon hundreds of
men in the same states, each of its offenses must be tried separate-
ly before a separate court and a separate jury.'
The "Dewey indictments" were of central importance to the Dewey method
of prosecution which envisaged large multi-defendant trials involving middle-
echelon and high-level members of racketgangs.
Dewey wasted no time in testing the efficacy of his new indictment law.
In 1936, in People v. Adams, the constitutionality of the new law was
95. Now essentially in the same form in section 200.20 of the Criminal Procedure Law. In
People ex rel Pincus v. Adams, 274 N.Y. 447, 9 N.E.2d 46, 50 (1937), the Court of Appeals
sustained the constitutionality of this joinder law which provided for joinder of separate similar
crimes which were part of a common scheme.
96. Id.
97. People ex rel. Luciano v. Murphy, Warden, 160 Misc. 573, 290 N.Y.S. 1011 (1936).
98. S. Moore, supra note 33, at 120.
99. S. WALKER, DEWEY: AN AMRICAN OF THIS CENTURY 53-54 (1944).
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brought into question."° In Adams, a multiple defendant extortion case
involving the restaurant industry, the Court of Appeals ruled that the new
law did not violate the New York Constitution."' The Court of Appeals
thus placed an invaluable weapon into Dewey's hands. The Columbia Law
Review hailed the law as a "blow struck at the racketeer."" ° The writer
went on to characterize the law in glowing terms as a means of reaching
higher up racketeers with maximum efficiency." Dewey's novel use of
statutes in racketeering cases was seen as a significant innovation and became
the model for the R.I.C.O. anti-racketeering statutes of 1970.
Dewey's most spectacular and effective use of his new law came in May
1936. In what was the crowning achievement of his term as special
prosecutor, Dewey indicted the notorious Lucky Luciano on ninety counts of
conspiracy to commit compulsory prostitution."° As part of this grand
conspiracy, Luciano and his cohorts were charged with placing women in
houses of prostitution and receiving money from their earnings.0 5 Dewey
tried the case himself. He elaborated at length on the scheme of prostitution
Luciano was said to control."° Luciano as the "brains" behind the
operation never took an active role in the daily operations of the business.
The main witnesses against Luciano were the prostitutes who worked under
his ostensible aegis. 7 The prostitutes were gathered together by Dewey
in raids on brothels in Manhattan.108 Many of them were charged with
minor crimes and "turned around" with promises of immunity from
prosecution. The new mode of indictment was a particularly useful method
for Dewey to prove a conspiracy. While this method of prosecution is
common place today, it was relatively novel in Dewey's day and had never
been practiced on so large a scale in New York County.
Dewey's broad use of immunity to encourage testimony had its critics.
Governor Lehman, the man who appointed Dewey, was particularly troubled
about giving witnesses immunity from prosecution."° He was further
disturbed by the liberal expense allowances accorded those who cooperated.
Nancy Presser, a prostitute, and one of the star witnesses against Luciano
was given an all expenses paid trip to Europe."0 Dewey justified the trip
100. Adams, 274 N.Y at 447, 9 N.E.2d at 46.
101. Id. at 50. Article 1, Section 6 of the New York State Constitution prohibits trial of any
one charged with the commission of an infamous crime except on presentation by a grand jury.
102. Recent Statutes, 37 COLUM. L. REV. 1029 (1937).
103. Id. at 1031.
104. See S. Moore, supra note 33, at 120-33.
105. Id. at 118.
106. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 194.
107. Id. at 195.
108. rd.
109. A. NEVINS, supra note 6, at 183.
110. S. Moore, supra note 33, at 130-131.
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on the grounds that it was necessary to protect her from the mob."'
Furthermore, a pro-Dewey magazine article stated that Dewey allowed each
female witness in his custody to shop and go out to dinner twice a month
under police escort.1 It is not clear whether all this was necessary to
protect the women from mob intimidation or actually was done by Dewey to
protect the testimony of his witnesses "to the fullest extent.""'
Lehman and others were particularly worried about Dewey's use of
convicted prisoners as witnesses. In return for their testimony, Dewey
promised to reduce their sentences. Lehman openly disagreed with Dewey
on this point and was rigid in his insistence that no promises of pardon,
commutation, or other form of leniency should ever be given in order to
obtain testimony against another person.1 Lehman felt the strong tempta-
tion of these witnesses to deviate from truth would undermine any inherent
value in their testimony. 15
Dewey's general handling of the Luciano trial and his attitude towards the
civil liberties of defendants and witnesses were not encouraging to Lehman.
To achieve maximum prosecutorial command and crime control goals,
Dewey ran roughshod over what Lehman considered due process rights.
Lehman believed efficient professional prosecution had to yield to bedrock
civil liberty concerns. 6
Dewey adhered to the general practice of the day of keeping many of his
prostitute witnesses away from their own lawyers and the defendants'
lawyers. 7 Lehman felt that Dewey's conduct was not justified even
though many of these women may not have testified had mob lawyers been
in contact with them or been present during interrogations." The potential
for abuse under such a regime by an unscrupulous prosecutor was enormous.
Another example of Dewey's excess was the incredibly broad scope of the
credibility questions Dewey asked Luciano on cross-examination.
Luciano, tried on a ninety count indictment for placing girls in
houses of prostitution and for accepting money from this activity,
was cross-examined interminably about his drug and gambling
activities decades earlier, about his underworld friendships, and
even about a series of arrests for traffic violations. In the course
of his Luciano summation, Special Prosecutor Dewey noted, inter
alia: "I am sure every one of you had not the slightest doubt
111. Id. at 131.
112. Center, The Halt of Racketeering, Atlantic Monthly, Oct. 1937, at 450.
113. Id. at 447.
114. A. NEVINS, supra note 6, at 183-84.
115. Id. at 185-89.
116. Id. at 183-84.
117. For the description of Dewey's practice in this regard, see Center, supra note 112, at 450.
118. For a discussion of Lehman's misgivings about Dewey's methods, see A. NEVINS, supra
note 6, at 180-85.
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there stood before you a gambler, not a race track man, but
stripped naked, the greatest gangster in America. You know that
and I know that."119
A profile of Dewey in The New Yorker took a scathingly critical view of
his conduct in the Luciano case.1" The writers accused Dewey of inflating
Luciano's evil reputation to the point where many casual newspaper readers
would think Luciano bore the same relationship to organized prostitution that
John D. Rockefeller had to oil.' The writers argued that according to
their investigation, many of Luciano's enemies claimed Luciano never got a
dollar from prostitution in his life."
As expected, Luciano fell victim to the Dewey assault. He appealed his
conviction to the Court of Appeals on the grounds that the indictment did not
set out any conspiratorial counts. The Court of Appeals, speaking through
Judge Crane, affirmed the conviction, stating that conspiracy need not be
alleged in the indictment so long as it is proven at trial, and there is no
variance between the indictment and the proof offered to sustain it.12
Luciano also attempted to attack the "Dewey indictments" but failed to
persuade the Court that his arguments had any validity." The principle
of People v. Luciano, that conspiracy need not be alleged in an indictment
as long as it is proven at trial that a common scheme or plan existed, still
remains good law in New York. This affirmance was another aid to Dewey
in his subsequent conspiracy cases.
Given Dewey's success in convicting Luciano and his general success as
Special Prosecutor against organized crime, it was pretty much of a fait
accompli that Dewey would run for New York County District Attorney. In
his campaign for office and in his formal term as District Attorney, Dewey
would concentrate on political corruption in New York County, specifically
Tammany Hall."z Dewey lashed out against the evils of Tammany and the
County Clerk Marinelli." The Dewey campaign developed from an initial
attack on racketeers to an assault on the unholy alliance between racketeers
and politicians. In a dramatic radio broadcast in October 1937, Dewey
accused Marinelli of being the "ally of thieves, pickpockets, thugs, dope
119. Kuh, Book Review, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1616 (1975) (reviewing DEWEY, TWENTY
AGAINST THE UNDERWORLD (1974)).




123. People v. Luciano, 277 N.Y. 348, 14 N.E.2d 433 (1938).
124. Id. at 351, 14, N.E.2d at 436.
125. Crime and Politics, Fourth in a Series of Radio Broadcasts on "The Inside Racket," by
Dewey Oct. 24, 1937, reported in S. WALKER, supra note 99, at 211-29.
126. Id. at 211.
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peddlers and big shot racketeers." 7 He then proceed to name people on
Marinelli's staff with criminal backgrounds." The coup de grace was
Dewey's suggestion of a collusive connection between Marinelli and Luciano,
along with Marinelli's appointment of voting inspectors with criminal
records. '2
The ever cascading attacks and the screaming newspaper headlines which
followed the carefully planned radio addresses put Dewey on the front page
for weeks. Governor Lehman, disturbed by Dewey's allegations and the
public spectacle, in effect, told Dewey to put up or shut up.' Dewey's
response was a massive grand jury investigation which resulted in Marinelli's
resignation under fire and Dewey's landslide election.131
But the sacking of Marinelli was not the prize catch Dewey wanted. He
yearned for the biggest bird in the Tammany menagerie, Tammany leader
James "Jimmy" Hines. 2 Dewey launched a full scale investigation to
prove Hines was the political protection man for the Schultz organization in
the Harlem numbers racket. 33 This was done on the basis of a cryptic
note found in the home of murdered mobster Jules Martin, an underworld
lieutenant in the Schultz gang, which stated simply "Speak to Jimmy Hines."
It was generally believed the Hines investigation and the anticipated
conviction would be the stepping stone for Dewey's run for Governor in
1938. Dewey decided to personally handle the Hines case. Once again, as
in the Luciano trial, there were allegations of misconduct in handling
prosecution witnesses. The most egregious example was Dewey's permitting
the star prosecution witness, lawyer Dixie Davis, to make daily conjugal
visits to his girlfriend."
Dewey's greatest mistake in the Hines case was handling it himself. He
had taken the "Mr. District Attorney" image so close to heart that he seemed
to feel infallible at times. One lawyer characterized Dewey's demeanor and
attitude during towards defense counsel as suggesting that any man who
stooped so low as to defend someone indicted by the Dewey office must be
a crook himself or colluding with criminal interests.'35
The crucial moment of the trial occurred when Dewey cross examined a
member of the former District Attorney's staff named Boston. As a defense
127. Id.
128. Id. at 214.
129. Organized Crime, supra note 53, at 129.
130. S. WALKER, supra note 99, at 86. See also H. POWELL, NINETY TIMES GUILTY (1934)(reprinted as H. POWELL, LUCKY LUClANO 44 (1975)) (an excellent account of the trial by a
contemporary journalist).
131. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 240.
132. Hines was the unofficial head of Tammany. As a party official and supporter of F.D.R.,
he was the official dispenser of New Deal patronage in New York City. See S. Moore, supra
note 33, at 181.
133. Id. at 183-84.
134. Id. at 187. See also N.Y. Times, Aug. 3, 1938, at 1.
135. Profiles, supra note 120, at 30.
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witness, Boston had testified that in 1935 as a member of the Dodge District
Attorney staff, he had investigated the poultry racket. Defense counsel Lloyd
Stryker had prefaced his questions to Boston by telling the witness to "[tiel[
the entire story of the March Grand Jury."'" Boston testified that evidence
linking the defendant Hines was given before the grand jury and that in his
opinion such evidence was not sufficient to support an indictment. 37
Dewey attempted to discredit Boston by showing he was inexperienced at the
time he handled the indictment bureau and therefore could not fairly evaluate
the case. He even intimated that Dodge had deliberately placed him in this
crucial position precisely because he wanted an inexperienced man there. 1 31
Then Dewey asked a fatal question. He asked Boston, if he remembered any
testimony about Hines and the poultry racket.1 39
Defense counsel immediately objected and moved for a mistrial on the
ground that Dewey's question was irreparably prejudicial to his client, that
the linking of Hines with a new racket, a new alleged criminal activity for
which he had never been indicted would fatally poison the minds of the
jury."4 Dewey responded by stating that Stryker himself had opened the
door by telling Boston to tell the entire story.41 The defense replied that
no such door had been opened. Boston's mentioning of other rackets
investigations before the Grand Jury were merely informational, to set the
scope of the Grand Jury probe and that in any event, Boston's testimony had
been strictly limited to the poultry racket-the designated indicted offense.
The words "tell the whole story" were limited to the context of their
utterance and were limited to the poultry racket alone.12
Rather than giving a curative instruction to the jury to disregard the
question, Judge Ferdinand Pecora took the mistrial motion under advisement
and adjourned the trial for the weekend.'43 The next day he ruled, in
perhaps the most important mistrial motion in New York's judicial history,
that Dewey's questions asking the witness whether there was evidence
presented about the poultry racket was "fatally prejudicial" to the defen-
dant. ' The question was improper, no door had been opened and since
no part of the testimony in direct examination linked defendant to the poultry
136. Evidence: Mistrial: Question by District Attorney Purporting to Connect Defendant with
a Crime Other Than Charged in Indictment, 24 CORNELL L.Q. 122 (1938) [hereinafter Evidence:
Mistrial].
137. Id. at 123.
138. R. HUGHES, ATTORNEY FOR THE PEOPLE, THE STORY OF THOMAS E. DEWEY 247 (1940).
139. Evidence: Mistrial, supra note 136, at 122.
140. Id.
141. Id. at 123.
142. S. Moore, supra note 33, at 193.
143. Id. at 193.
144. Id. at 193-194.
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racket a new trial would have to be convened.1" Pecoral, a New Deal
Democrat hostile to Dewey's grand standing, may have made his decision on
the basis of judicial discretion and political expediency. The whole episode
illustrates Dewey's arrogance and sense of invincibility. It was one of
Dewey's few setbacks and one of the few instances in which the judiciary
limited Dewey's tactics. Hines was convicted on retrial. 14
B. The Blue Ribbon Jury Issue
There was no area of the criminal justice system towards which Dewey was
a more passionate devotee than Blue Ribbon juries." 7 In fact, in more
than ninety percent of his Special Prosecutor cases he demanded and received
a Blue Ribbon panel.1"' Because of the generally conservative, business
background of these panels, they were referred to as "prosecutor's jurors."
The existence of this now vanished species of criminal juries is important in
understanding Dewey's success and phenomenal conviction rate. It must be
remembered that antebellum prosecutor's corps in New York City did not
operate under the handicap of their post-war successors; they did not deal
with venires coming from the community as a whole.
The existence, fairness, and legal propriety of Blue Ribbon juries sparked
one of the major debates over the criminal justice system in the 1930s.
Critics of the Blue Ribbon system felt it was unfair, racist, anti-semitic, pro-
Wasp, and biased towards the state. The New Yorker sarcastically character-
ized Blue Ribbon juries as being a part of the prosecution. Conviction was
"not a difficult feat with a blue-ribbon jury, which usually imagines that it
has been divinely appointed to convict, anyway."" 49 Newsweek stated that
Blue Ribbon juries were chosen from a special panel of high-standing New
Yorkers from which workers were excluded."5 The qualities desired in
Blue Ribbon jurors included having an open mind about capital punishment
145. People v. Hines, 284 N.Y. 93, 29 N.E.2d 483 (1940). See also N.Y. Times, Sept. 12,
1938, at 19-19.
146. In affiming his conviction the New York Court of Appeals held that any individual who
acts as a confederate in a lottery scheme can be convicted as a principal regardless of the fact
there is no evidence that he physically ran the illegal scheme. See Hines, 284 N.Y. at 104, 29
N.E.2d at 489.
147. Blue Ribbon juries were special juries which had higher than usual property or income
qualifications for sitting as jurors. They were said to discriminate against working class
defendants by denying them trial by their peers. The Supreme Court rejected an equal protection
argument challenging them in Fay v. New York, 332 U.S. 261, 270 (1947). The New York
statute was repealed in 1965 (Judiciary Law §§ 749-aa (repealed 1965, ch. 778 sec. 3)).
148. For Dewey's view about the need for a non-unanimous criminal justice system as a
needed reform, see DEWEY, TWENTY AGAINSTTHE UNDERWORLD (1974). At one point Dewey
calls the unanimous jury verdict an "outworn relic of the primitive condition of law enforce-
ment." Id. at 393. Dewey also believed a non-unanimous jury verdict would prevent juries
being influenced by bribery. He offers no evidence of a jury being bribed.
149. Profiles, supra note 120, at 30.
150. Newsweek, Aug. 29, 1938, at 9-10.
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and the use of circumstantial evidence and possessing "alertness, intelligence,
and common sense. " 1
The debate over Blue Ribbon juries came to a head in January 1938 when
a special state Judicial Council Report, written by the highly regarded Chief
Judge of the New York Court of Appeals, Frederick Crane, urged Governor
Lehman to move for their abolition. The report urged abolition on the
grounds that Blue Ribbon juries were unfair as shown by their extremely
high conviction rates.152 The report also noted that their use was limited
to New York City and Westchester counties. The veiled suggestion was
made that use of the Blue Ribbon juries in these counties was directly related
to higher concentrations of immigrant and ethnic populations and a distrust
of having too many of them serve on criminal cases. The opponents of Blue
Ribbon Juries submitted an abolition bill to the Senate, which voted to
eliminate the system. 5 '
In response, Dewey stated that the abolition of Blue Ribbon panels would
seriously impede the system of justice in New York City."5  Dewey
received widespread support in the press against these changes. The New
York 7Imes felt that a legitimate distinction could be drawn between old
forms of crime and sophisticated urban crime. The "jurors in dealing with
rackets crime needed more than ordinary intelligence to understand the
complex goings on of racketeering in the urban setting. 5'
The introduction of Dewey's legislative lobbying before the Assembly vote
set the stage for an acrimonious assembly hearing. Dewey sent the head of
his Indictment Bureau, Stanley Fuld, to lobby against abolition. Fuld
testified that the entire Blue Ribbon jury issue was a red herring designed to
divert attention from the fundamental necessity of dealing with overwhelming
problems of organized crime." s He told the Assembly Committee that
there were several unemployed men on the Blue Ribbon juries and that,
therefore, Blue Ribbon Juries did not constitute a form of class justice. 5 7
Fuld contended that there was no evidences suggesting that the membership
of special juries was determined by class or wealth.5
The chief opposition to Dewey and the pro-Blue Ribbon forces were
organized labor, the Democrats, civil liberties groups, and some notable
defense counsel. Future State Supreme Court Justice Samuel Leibowitz, an
151. Id. at 10.
152. PROCEEDINGS OF THE NEW YORK JUDICIAL COUNCIL46 (1937). The Blue Ribbon juries
conviction rate for homicide was eighty-three percent over a four-year period. The regular jury
panel conviction rate over the same period was forty-three percent.
153. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1938, at 2, col. 3.
154. N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1938, at 32; N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1938, at 2, col. 3.
155. N.Y. Times, Feb. 22, 1938, at 22, col. 2. Dewey's letter to the state committee stated




158. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1938, at 2, col. 3.
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articulate proponent of abolition, appeared before the Assembly committee.
Leibowitz later gained a reputation as a hard-nosed draconian judge who
often appeared on television to defend capital punishment. The Samuel
Leibowitz of the 1930s, however, was one of the leading defense counsel in
the country and a prominent civil libertarian. 59
Leibowitz told the Committee that district attorneys' delighted in packing
juries with pro-prosecution jurors. '0 He claimed Dewey and others kept
lists derived from the past records of Blue Ribbon juries in order to predict
future performance."' Leibowitz also claimed that a jury commissioner
had told him Jews were excluded from Blue Ribbon venires because they
were soft-hearted. In dramatic terms, Leibowitz concluded his plea for
reform by referring to a two-hundred member panel of Blue Ribbon jurors
on one of his cases: "I bet you could go through it with a fine-toothed comb
and not be able to find a man on it from the ordinary strata of life." He
further stated that district attorneys "delight in packing these Blue Ribbon
juries of theirs with rope-pullers, persons whom they can depend upon to
hand down a conviction. "16
Despite Leibowitz's eloquent testimony and the strong opposition of labor,
the effect of Dewey's opposition to the bill was overwhelming. The
Assembly refused to report the bill out of committee where it died."64
Dewey's influence on the legislative process seemed decisive in defeating the
bill.
Later in 1938, during the Hines retrial, Lloyd Stryker made a feeble
attempt to rekindle the Blue Ribbon jury issue. During the jury selection
process he charged that the Blue Ribbon venire was "unconstitutionally
disproportionate as to the number of colored persons in this community."s
The court rejected his argument and no appeal was taken."6
A glance at the Blue Ribbon venire in the Hines case seem to confirm
Stryker's view and the testimony of Leibowitz. An examination of the
occupational status of the listed veniremen shows a panel heavily ladened
with white collar workers and top management personnel. Bankers, brokers,
realtors, and engineers predominated. 7 Ethnic names are in the minority
and the few Jewish names seem to be from upper crust "uptown" German
Jewish families.16
159. For Leibowitz's role in that case see D. CARTER, SCOTTSBORO TRAGEDY OF THE
AMERICAN SOUTH (1979).
160. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1938, at 2.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. N.Y. Times, Feb. 23, 1938, at 2, col. 3.
164. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1938, at 1, col. 6.
165. N.Y. Post, Aug. 1, 1938, at 7, col. 1.
166. Id.
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Opposition to Dewey's use of the Blue Ribbon jury crystallized in the 1937
Report to the Legislature of the Judicial Council of the State of New York.
The Council included the Chief Judge of the Court of Appeals and the
presiding justices of the Appellate Division.1" It recommended the
abolition of the special juries to the 1937 Legislature." °
Dewey criticized the Report and dismissed the notion that the Blue Ribbonjuries suffered from any legal infirmities or prejudice. He argued that as
jurors eventually evolved and became more adept at complicated cases, the
Blue Ribbon juries would become obsolete. The high conviction rate, he
argued, was not a product of jury prejudice but was rather a result of the
more thorough preparation and time devoted to the case by his assistants.17'
Dewey's thinking on this question was consistent with the dominant crime
control feelings of his time. A fair trial by one's peers did not extend to a
cross-section of one's peers. Indeed Dewey's thinking was consistent with
the prevailing national judicial norms on criminal procedure. In Fay v. New
Yorl' the United States Supreme Court rejected a constitutional challenge
to New York County's use of the Blue Ribbon jury which had been mounted
on equal protection and due process grounds. The Court, speaking through
Justice Jackson decided that there was no constitutional infirmity. Under the
fundamental fairness test, the Court felt no need to intrude in the state
criminal process.
C. Dewey and the New York State
Constitutional Convention of 1938
Though Dewey's impact on law reform and the Blue Ribbon jury question
was considerable, his impact was even greater on the issue addressed by the
State Constitutional Convention, namely, whether New York should have a
constitutionally based exclusionary rule.
In 1938, New York State had no state constitutional equivalent to the
Fourth Amendment. The subject of privacy was covered by statute in section
8 of the Civil Rights Law which largely mirrored the Federal Constitution.
Though the United States Supreme Court had promulgated an exclusionary
rule as a remedy to Fourth Amendment violations by police in Weeks v.
United States,"7 the New York Court of Appeals, speaking through Judge
169. N.Y. Times, Mar. 9, 1938, at 1, col. 6.
170. N.Y. Post, Aug. 1, 1938, at 7, col. 1.
171. Christian Science Monitor, Sept. 23, 1939 (Magazine), at 6. The writer speculated that
Dewey's phenomenal success as a prosecutor and as a possible road to the Presidency could be
attributed to the Blue Ribbon jury. Id.
172. 332 U.S. 261 (1947). During the five years ending in 1938, Dewey Blue Ribbon juries
convicted 299 times and acquitted 84 times. Dewey claimed that Blue Ribbon juries were no
different than other juries which restricted members to those members certain to be free of
qualms about capital punishment, the use of circumstantial evidence and certain types of crimes.
Christian Science Monitor, supra note 171, at 6.
173. 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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Cardozo, in People v. Defore,74 had declined to extend such a rule to the
state. Cardozo felt there was no showing of any legislative intention in
section 8 to overrule the earlier decision of the Court of Appeals in People
v. Adams'75 which similarly failed to extend the exclusionary rule to the
state.
Beyond New York precedent, Cardozo was satisfied that the rule of Lord
Camden in Entick v. CarringtoP76 was sufficient. Under Entick the
remedy for illegal seizure was a civil action for trespass against the offender,
in this case, the police. While Cardozo recognized the validity of an
exclusionary rule as a means to increase individual privacy rights against the
government, he believed the individual's gain would be a "disproportionate
loss of protection to society."" 7 Cardozo felt the social need to suppress
crime outweighed the loss of individual privacy. However, he left open the
possibility that the "organs of government by which a change of public
policy is normally effected, shall give notice to the courts that the change has
come to pass." 78
By 1938, the Lehman Democrats at the Convention believed that the
"organs of government" should be prepared to act and expand the indivi-
dual's right to privacy in criminal cases and create a deterrent against police
misconduct. While Dewey represented the conventional law enforcement
view that the trespass remedy was sufficient, the Lehman Democrats were
convinced that the trespass remedy was inadequate in the modern world.
The expanded modern state and technology made more intrusive methods of
crime detection a threat to the very core of individual privacy.
For the Lehman Democrats who attended the Convention, the world had
changed considerably by 1938. The insidiousness of the fading "third
degree" was replaced by the insidiousness of the growing police state.
Dewey's progressive model of a few good men was not enough. Institutional
controls on the police behavior were necessary. The Lehman forces at the
Convention were represented by State Senate majority leader John Dunnigan,
Judge Charles Poletti, and lawyer and Judge Edward Weinfeld.179 This
was a fusing of Reform and Tammany. For them, the shadow of Europe
cast a long shadow over law enforcement in America. The Constitutional
Convention was thus enveloped by the specter of European fascism. Perhaps
it was Herbert Lehman, the sensitive German-American Jew, along with
Poletti and Weinfeld, both one step out of the ghetto themselves, who
fashioned a world view more expansive than the native Dewey. Dewey had
more confidence in the tradition of fair play and the fair minded prosecutor.
174. 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E. 585 (1926).
175. 176 N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903), aft'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904).
176. 95 Eng. Rep. 807, 2 L.R.-K.B, 275, 19 How. St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
177. Defore, 242 N.Y. at 25, 150 N.E. at 589.
178. Id.
179. Edward Weinfeld was a Lehman advisor who served in his cabinet and later became a
distinguished federal judge who served on the bench for over thirty years.
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In Governor Lehman's latter address to the Convention of June 13, 1938,
the battle lines were drawn. Lehman's speech was monothematic. The most
important work of the Convention was to pass a State search and seizure
clause."s He told of how every state in the Union contained a search and
seizure clause except New York."' He warned that:
In these crucial days when democracy is challenged in many parts
of the world and when we have a compelling duty and privilege
to preserve democracy against the assaults of both communism
and fascism, I am of the firm conviction that the Constitutional
Convention now assembled in New York has no more important
task before it than that of strengthening the Bill of Rights."
But Lehman was not content with merely replicating the Fourth Amend-
ment. He further asserted the necessity for a state constitution exclusionary
rule against not only physical searches but also against wiretap and telegraphinterceptions. 11
Lehman, as if anticipating Dewey's objections, rejected the notion that an
exclusionary provision would handicap district attorneys and impede the
capture of criminals. He pointed out his intensive efforts against organized
crime as well as his legislative recommendations from the 1935 statewide
anti-crime convention.Y1 After establishing his commitment to law
enforcement, he argued that all that the exclusionary provision would do
would be to transfer scrutiny to the courts and check potential abuses in
police prosecutorial discretion."s He touted the effective use of the Weeks
rule in the federal system and compared the exclusionary rule to the
reasonable doubt requirement that juries are given as a necessary cost of
democracy. He warned against autocratic tendencies in the air. Lehman
concluded by stating that the state must be "ever vigilant to apply [the Bill
of Rights] to new situations, created by modern conditions.""8 6
As soon as Lehman's speech was read into the record, it was requested that
the Convention read into the record a speech by Dewey given two days
earlier at the District Attorney Convention in Cooperstown, New York."s
Dewey attacked the proposed exclusionary rule as a shackling of law
180. REVISED RECORD OF THE CONVENnON OF THE STATE OF NEw YORK 336-40 (1938)
[hereinafter CONVENTION RECORD].
181. Id. at 336.
182. Id. at 337.
183. Id. at 339-40.
184. Id. at 337. See generally PROCEEDING OF THE GOVERNOR'S CONFERENCE ON CRIME:
THE CRIMINAL AND SOCIETY (1932). (This conference was directed at interstate cooperation
against organized crime and the necessity for uniform laws of extradition.)
185. CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 180, at 339.
186. Id. at 340.
187. Id. at 368.
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enforcement which would only benefit gangsters. 8 Dewey stated that he
did not encourage the use of illegal searches but felt the civil remedies in
Defore were a sufficient deterrent to improper police conduct." Since the
language of the Fourth Amendment was contained in Section 8 of the Civil
Rights Law, there was no need to give the language constitutional dimen-
sions. There were too many instances of necessity where a warrant could not
be obtained in time.1" The proposal would have the singular effect of
protecting only the guilty. 91 Dewey asserted that the public needed to rely
"on the theory that public officials may be trusted to do their duty.'" Any
other theory asserts that democracy is a failure. I do not believe that
democracy is a failure."" Thus, Dewey was invoking the incessant theme
of the good model prosecutor as the hope of democracy. The legislature
could only hinder the work of the prosecutor unless it passed laws to help the
detection and adjudication of crime. Only "Legs" Diamond and "Dutch"
Schultz would benefit, not the innocent. That was the crime control
message.
The Lehmanites, in response to Dewey, flooded the Convention with
exclusionary amendments.' Weinfeld, Judge Poletti, State Assemblyman
Irwin Steingut, and the majority leader James J. Dunningan all proposed
separate amendments. The forces gathered around the Civil Rights
Committee headed by Dunningan. Led by Dunnigan, an architect from the
Bronx, a searching and profound debate ensued on the nature of privacy. 95
Dunningan in particular invoked the name of Lord Camden and the Anglo-
American tradition of personal privacy against state intrusion. The tradition
was linked by Dunningan to Lehman's explicit nightmare of the present, the
specter of Nazi Germany.
In these tumultuous times when human liberties are being
restrained, it would be rescue work for us to reaffirm our faith,
to enlarge our rights, and to unqualifiedly demonstrate that no fear
of freedom exists in our State. Particularizing, no human right is
being challenged as boldly today as the right of privacy in person
and home. The horrors of uniformed men brutally entering homes
188. Id. at 373.
189. Id. at 371.
190. Id. at 370.
191. Id. at 373.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. V. O'ROURKE & D. CAMPBELL, CONSTITUTION-MAKINGIN A DEMOCRACY, THEORY AND
PRACTICES IN NEW YORK STATE 118-19 (1943). For a succinct summary of the New York
State Constitutional history, see P. S. GALIE, NEW YORK STATE CONSTITUTION A REFERENCE
GUIDE (1991).
195. V. O'ROURKE & D. CAMPBELL, supra note 194, at 118-21; See CONVENTION RECORD,
supra note 180, at 407-594. In many ways it mirrored the forums of the recent Bork debate on
privacy, however, with more nuance and depth in the range of its concerns.
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of ordinary folk on excursions of curiosity are too much with us.
As states become collectivistic, individuals become units and their
liberties are submerged. The writing of a search and seizure
clause into our Constitution would be a gesture of faith in
democratic processes."'
Along with Dewey, the main opponents to the Dunnigan proposal were
Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia and the Republican Party."
Dewey eventually had to back down from his uncompromising stance.
This was a result of an effective campaign by the Dunnigan forces. They
strategically used the political climate of the 1930s to compare a state without
a search and seizure provision in its constitution to a Nazi state. 98 Under
this onslaught, Dewey pragmatically modified his views. He began to favor
incorporation into the constitution of a search clause without an exclusionary
clause."9  Further modification occurred when Dewey agreed that the
constitutional language could forbid wiretapping except under court
supervision." However, fundamental disagreement remained over the
exclusionary provision.
Dunnigan also modified his position. He no longer requested that wiretaps
be obtained by warrants which were thought to be too public. Instead, the
tap could be obtained by an ex parte order which could be kept secret. 1
The constitutional debate, therefore, centered around the propriety of
including the exclusionary rule in the Constitution. The first speaker in the
debate attacked Dewey's position by stating that it is more important that a
person be tried under the law than that someone be found guilty.202 The
next speaker evoked the Nazi analogy by pointing out that no exclusionary
clause existed in Germany.'
The Republicans responded by stating that they also believed in a vigorous
affirmation of the right of the person against unreasonable search and
seizure.' They declared, however, that there was a lawless element in
society which must be fought with every weapon at the government's
disposal. 05 It was the solemn duty of the convention not to cripple the law
196. CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 180, at 359.
197. LaGuardia called the proposed Dunnigan language a "New Magna Charta of Crime."
N.Y. Times, June 15, 1938, at 12, col. 3.
198. CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 180, at 412-14.
199. This bill known as "Dewey-Lewis" passed. See V. O'ROARKE & D. CAMPBELL, supra
note 194, at 120; and N.Y. Times, June 19, 1938 at 1, col. 6.
200. CONVENTION RECORD, supra note 180, at 415.
201. Id. at 407.
202. Id. at 411.
203. Id. at 412.
204. Id. at 414-15.
205. Id. at 415.
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enforcement agencies in their fight against racketeers.' Civil damages as
an enforcement mechanism against state wrongdoers was enough and no
criminal should go free because a police officer made a mistake.'
Finally, they argued that the whole question involved a mere rule of evidence
not a question of constitutional dimensions."
As June 1938 ended and the vote neared, Dewey effectively co-opted the
strength of his opponents. By adopting most of the provisions of the
Dunnigan bill minus the exclusionary rule, Dewey relieved himself of the
Nazi onus. By compromising and coming out in favor of the Fourth Amend-
ment provision, he could now focus the debate on the exclusionary provision
in a law and order issue context. The climax of the Dewey campaign came
in the June 12, 1938 nationally broadcast speech to New York State District
Attorney's organization meeting at Cooperstown.
In a rousing speech, Dewey called for the people of New York to stand up
and fight against the Dunnigan proposal.' ° He branded the Dunnigan
amendment a "reactionary and dangerous limitation on the power of the state
to protect its people.""' He felt the Dunnigan amendment would sabotage
the progress he had made in his fight against organized crime. The "beyond
a reasonable doubt" standard was enough in a criminal trial."I To allow
the guilty to go free because the police made a mistake would protect no one
but the guilty."' The innocent would not benefit by the suppression of
evidence. The only ones who would benefit (and he named names) would
be Al Capone, "Lucky" Luciano and "Dutch" Shultz.213
The Dewey speech had its intended effect on the convention. With
Dewey's words echoing in their ears, they voted down the Dunnigan
amendment and adopted the Dewey proposal instead."1 4 Thus, New York
state seemed saved from a constitutionally mandated suppression doc-
trine.2 15
As Dewey ended his term as District Attorney in 1940, rumors of his
consideration as a presidential nominee began to spread.' Quite aside
from critical evaluations of Dewey's general qualifications for high office,
206. Id. at 416.
207. Id. at 416.
208. Id. at 431-32.
209. Id. at 374.
210. Id. at 374.
211. Id. at 369.
212. Id. at 370.
213. Id. at 373.
214. V. O'RouRKE & D. CAMPBELL, supra note 180, at 121.
215. N.Y. Herald-Tribune, June 29, 1938, at 1, col. 1. See W. HARBOUGH, A L.AWYER'S
LAWYER: THE LIFE OF JOHN W. DAVIS 438 (1990). Following the loss on the exclusionary
provision at the Constitutional Convention, Lehman supported a bill sponsored by Assemblyman
Robert Wagner, Jr. to have New York adopt an exclusionary statute. This bill failed to pass in
1939.
216. R. SMITH, supra note 36, at 274-75.
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specific questions were raised about his civil liberties background by
Democrats based on the position he took on the wiretap and Blue Ribbon
jury controversies, combined with the manner in which he handled witnesses
for the state in the Luciano trial.
Liberal opinion journals such as New Republic and The American Mercury
were particularly alarmed by Dewey's record and his attitude toward the
criminal justice system." 7 A particularly biting attack was written by
Benjamin Stolberg. Stolberg, indulging in a bit of verbal overkill, accused
Dewey of being a "radical reactionary" and positively "Geobbelesque" on
wiretapping."' Stolberg stated that Dewey's conceptions of criminal
justice inevitably reminds one of the psychologist who builds a labyrinthine
trap for rats, to learn whether or how soon they could get out of it."19
Stolberg was particularly incensed by what he perceived to be the class
justice the Blue Ribbon juries meted out. He referred to the problem of
"notorious racketeers [placed] before a jury of squash racketeers." Stolberg
recognized the strong points of the Dewey regime, such as his honest fight
against organized crime, the general lack of corruption in his office, and
Dewey's yeoman-like efforts to rid the bench or corruption.' He felt,
however, all of these positive elements, which made the New York County
criminal justice apparatus one of the most efficient and effective in the
country, were initiated by its lack of concern for substantive justice." In
the name of efficiency, Dewey had created a system in which convictions
became the overwhelming goal of the system.
Despite Stolberg's somewhat colorful verbalisms and intemperate style, his
article addressed the critical question of how realistic efficiency could
compete in the criminal justice system against the need to maintain adequate
civil liberties for defendants regardless of their notoriety or alleged criminal
past.' A revolution in the criminal justice procedure system had occurred
under Dewey. While many recognized the new streamlined structure he
created, few sought to look behind the flashy exterior of change and explore
217. Id. at 137. Stolberg was upset by Dewey's stance on the state constitution wire tapping
provisions when Dewey accused pro-exclusionary rule public officials as having their position
inspired by the love of the underworld.
218. Stolberg, Thomas E. Dewey, Self Made Myth, American Mercury, June 1940, at 137.
219. Id.
220. For an excellent discussion of Dewey's role in forcing Martin Manton, the Chief Judge
of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, from the bench see generally J. BORKIN, THE CORRUPT
JUDGE NEW YORK (1968).
221. Stolberg, supra note 218, at 143-144. Stolberg criticized the class justice inherent in
Dewey's support of the Blue Ribbon system as resembling a lower east side racketeer being
convicted by a "jury of squash raecqueteers from the upper east side."
222. Stolberg saw Dewey as part of a Brahmin class of crime control advocates who not only
favored Blue Ribbon juries unanimous verdicts but also favored comments by the judge on the
defendant's failure to take the stand. Id.
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the problems a "racket-buster, steamroller" approach to justice would cause
in the United States' constitutional system.'
A seminal article by the young Herbert Wechsler in The Journal of
Criminal Law and Criminology explored this issue and put the 1930s racket-
crime phenomena in perspective.' The article entitled, "A Caveat on
Crime Control" explored the problems involved in trying to understand what
the increased emphasis on crime control meant to American society.
Wechsler argued that the public had been led to believe that crime control
had become a science, a tight scholarly discipline. The "scientists" and
"experts" who attended the numerous conferences and hearings could
somehow, from their vast fund of knowledge, solve the practical problems
in preventing the spread of crime.' This crime control model was
reinforced by the daily barrage of newspaper and motion picture stories about
men like Dewey and J. Edgar Hoover. This reinforcement fostered the
conventional wisdom that "crime programs of the Lehman type, and
prosecution of the Dewey type will substantially eliminate crime."' This
belief was paralleled by the "almost as widely held . . .belief that the
Bureau of Investigation fulfills the principal function of the Department of
Justice of the United States."'2 7
Wechsler approached his critical evaluation reluctantly since he believed
there were many positive values attached to the public's new concern with
and awareness of crime. The aroused public enthusiasm had aided Dewey
and others in dealing with problems of inefficiency and corruption in the
criminal justice system. Nonetheless an excess of enthusiasm could cause an
over-simplification of the crime problem. This could lead the public to
believe the crusade against crime could produce results the system was
actually incapable of achieving. Moreover, the ramifications of uncontrolled
zeal in the name of crime control could be profoundly detrimental to
American society and civil liberties.
Anticipating many of the arguments later put forth by Herbert Packer,
Wechsler posited three issues which the criminal justice system had to
grapple with: (1) what consequences of behavior is it desirable to prevent;
(2) what behavior tends to produce these consequences, directly or indirectly,
or serves to identify persons who are likely to engage in such behavior; and
(3) which of these forms of behavior can be prevented by the methods of the
criminal law, without causing more harmful consequences than the preven-
tion is worth.'
223. The author saw Dewey's support of all these measures as being enthralled with the idea
of efficacy rather than substantive justice. Id.





228. Id. at 630.
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The third problem was particularly troubling to Wechsler within the milieu
of American society of 1938. He was concerned with the consequences of
instituting new offenses and procedures such as state public enemy laws,
elaborate vagrancy statutes, "Dewey indictments," and the various anti-
racketeering measures advanced by the criminal justice system. The dilemma
created by the enactment of these measures is that the "broader and more
effective such measures are as weapons against the professional criminal, the
greater also is the danger that they will be employed against strikers, labor
organizers, political reformers and others who may incur the displeasure of
the police. " '
The danger, Wechsler believed, did not lie simply in the possibility of
corruption and abuse in the prosecutor's office. The more fundamental
problem, which he felt criminologists failed to note, was that not all behavior
which threatens violence or the potential for violence is equally reprehensi-
ble, if reprehensible at all.' As an example, Wechsler was concerned
with potential adverse effects that these laws could have on the still relatively
immature labor movement of the 1930s." Though labor unions make the
possibility of strikes higher and thus raise the possibility of violence, the
potential for misconduct was outweighed by the positive nature of the labor
movement. 2  One could not justify abolishing unions because of their
potential for violence.
By analogy, Wechsler argued the term "racketeering" also posed difficul-
ties. For Wechsler, a capitalist economy:
[o]ften posits difficulties in distinguishing between 'racketeering'
activity from clever financing, the exploitation of new opportu-
nities, shrewd competition or even aggressive labor leadership.
Not all these difficulties are overcome by Dewey's definition of
racketeering as 'the systematic extortion or money through
intimidation by an organization conducted for that purpose' for the
whole problem resides in the question what is intimidation and
what is permissible pressure or persuasion? Since laws must be
drafted in general terms, difficulties such as this can be met only
by conferring upon administrative officers a discretion by which
involves dangers, well marked in our times, to which many crime
experts remain remarkably insensitive, although these dangers are
at least as serious as those of crime itself?3




233. Id. at 632-33.
[Vol. 28
34
California Western Law Review, Vol. 28 [1991], No. 1, Art. 2
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol28/iss1/2
1991] RIsE OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY URBAN PROSECUTOR 35
Wechsler elaborated on his theme about the uncertain calculus of interests
involved in determining a measured mode of criminal enforcement. He
criticized the more dogmatic statements of police, social workers, and
psychiatrists who labored under the notion that there was a fixed answer to
crime which just happened to be located in their respective professional
fields. Wechsler, in effect, called for a plague on all professional houses,
claiming that there may not be any genuine solution to the crime problem.
It may ultimately defy solution because current knowledge still remained
insufficient to guide a rational choice for the state.'
The bias and narrow thinking which Wechsler believed characterized the
conventional wisdom of the 1930s was particularly prevalent in search and
seizure problems. Wechsler believed the calculus of conventional interests
weighed heavily in favor of efficiency. 5 If the police could effectuate a
wiretap why not let them do it. Search and seizure laws were characterized
as mere "legal obstacles," what are today called "technicalities."
Wechsler believed Dewey and others lost sight of this big picture in the
name of efficient law enforcement. 6  Such Dewey proposals as non-
unanimous jury verdicts, comments by the prosecutor on defendant's failure
to testify, and abolition of the privilege against self-incrimination ignored the
ultimate test of efficiency which says that prosecution must not be measured
solely by the success with which the guilty are convicted and the innocent
acquitted. It is the nature of judicial proof that such actual guilt or innocence
cannot always be known. Therefore any device which makes it more
efficient to convict, potentially makes it more efficient to convict the
innocent. Where is the balance struck? In calling for a much broader model
than that suggested by the crime control model, Wechsler didn't present easy
solutions. Rather he stated:
That the problems of social reform, present dilemmas of their
own, I do not pretend to deny. I argue only that one can say for
social reform as a means to the end of improved crime control
what can also be said for better personnel but cannot be said for
drastic tightening of the processes of the criminal law-that even
if the end should not be achieved, the means is desirable for its
own sake.237
Wechsler's critique of the 1930s accepted shibboleths of crime control
identified the limits of the Dewey model. By criticizing the limitation of the
Dewey-Warren Republican Prosecutorial Model, he exposed Dewey's
dangerous technocratic tendencies to get the job done-the job of catching
234. Id. at 635-36.
235. Id. at 637.
236. Id. at 630-37.
237. Id. at 637.
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criminals as quickly and as efficiently as possible. In this quest for
efficiency, the prosecutor lost sight of his other job-the job of insuring due
process. Wechsler clearly saw the limitations of the model prosecutor
without legislative or judicial limits. In the war against organized crime
there were certain institutional norms which could not be entrusted even to
good prosecutors. They could not be allowed to exercise an unfettered
discretion. Both Dewey and Warren were constantly on the road addressing
police chief conferences. They criticized the corruption of existing police
departments and sought to professionalize them. Unfortunately they never
quite solved the dilemma of the necessity of a prosecutor being independent
of, and yet dependent on the police force. Linked to this was Wechsler's
concern that in the name of law and order and anti-racketeering, the
prosecutor would confuse racketeering with a legitimate labor movement.
Indirectly responding to Wechsler's article, Dewey addressed the American
Labor Party at Carnegie Hall in October of 1937. Dewey said that it was not
the role of the prosecutor to involve himself in labor conflicts. He criticized
any notion that everytime there is a strike there should be a criminal investi-
gation or that a criminal conspiracy existed. Honest collective bargaining
had to be distinguished from the gangster element that was not part of the
labor movement. 215
It was in this area of the prosecutor's response to industrial conflict that the
differences between Dewey and Warren were most vivid. Wechsler's ideas
and criticism of the possible use of conspiracy and anti-racketeering statutes
against labor may be measured against Earl Warren as prosecutor.
IV. EARL WARREN AS PROSECUTOR
Dewey was always careful to draw the line between prosecutions which
were and those which were not inspired not by anti-labor bias or unpopular
political groups. Earl Warren was not. Many of the dangerous aspects of
the prosecutor as an unchecked law and order crusader came to fruition in
the era of Earl Warren.
Warren's prosecutorial hubris was such that he was unable to restrain
himself when faced with a prosecution with political overtones, namely the
labor movements on the docks of Oakland. His inner compass would not
allow him to heed Wechsler's call for restraint. While Dewey's only
political prosecution may be found in an embezzlement conviction against
Fritz Kuhn, the head of the German-American Bund,1 9 Warren enjoyed a
virulently hostile relationship with the west coast dock unions.' Warren
238. S. WAUCER, supra note 99, at 205-10.
239. S. Moore, supra note 33, at 233, 236.
240. For an extensive and perhaps definitive discussion of Warren's intense and mostly
negative relationship with labor unions see M. Feingold, The King-Ramsey-Conner Case: Labor
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would find positive political capital throughout his prosecutorial career in
California by emphasizing his Anti-American theme against defendants in
many labor and ethnic castes.
Earl Warren was born in Los Angeles in 1891.. His father was a
Scandinavian immigrant who worked as a repairman on the Southern Pacific
railroad. 4 The senior Warren worked his way up to foreman. Later in
life, through shrewd real estate investments, he owned several buildings. 2
However, Warren's early life was lived just above the poverty line. He
experienced the despair and hard existence of the railroad man. He worked
his way through Berkeley as both an undergraduate and a law student. 3
After two years of private practice in the early 1920s, he entered public life
as an Assistant District Attorney in Alameda County, California.' In
1926 he ran a reform-minded Progressive ticket against the incumbent
Tommy Kelly. He saw his task as District Attorney as similar to Dewey's:
to run an efficient and honest office and steer clear of special interests and
machine politics. 4 5 As a philosophical protege of Hiram Johnson, the
godfather of California Progressivism, Warren saw his role as a crusad-
er.' In the words of his best biographer, his role was to fight against
"vice, corruption and crime."' He professionalized California law
enforcement by making it "efficient, insuring its independence from partisan
politics or pressure groups, and demonstrating its sensitivity to public
opinion."24
To achieve the progress reforms and clean house, Warren tended to hire
World War I veterans and recent law school graduates. He felt both would
be free of partisan taint. 49 He also hired lawyers of diverse ethnic back-
grounds as Dewey had done.' Warren saw the crusade against graft,
241. G. WHITE, supra note 21, at 11-14.
242. Id. at 47.
243. Id. at 16.
244. Id. at 25. The District Attorney's office in Alameda County was often a stepping stone
to political success. Many deputies such as Warren's predecessor Erza DeCoto began as
assistant prosecutors as did Warren. Warren felt DeCoto was not an aggressive prosecutor but
an honest one. Warren's pattern of upward movement to the bench was a micro version of
many of his fellow deputies who became judges in California courts. For a discussion of the
"part time" notion of public law service which Warren rejected and changed to full time law
amongst his deputies, see generally L. FRIEDMAN & R. PERCIVAL, THE ROOTS OF JUSTICE,
CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ALAMEDA COUNTY, CAUFORNIA 1870-1910, at 49-51 (1983).





250. Earl Warren, Oral History Project, Vol. 1 Perspectives on the Alameda County District
Attorney's Office, University of California Bancroft Library Berkeley 1972, Edith Balaban:
Reminiscences about Nathan Harry Miller, Deputy District Attorney, Alameda County. Ms.
Balahan discussed Warren's positive relations with her late husband who was one of Warren's
early and trusted appointments. She states that Warren had a warm relationship with her
husband who was a Jewish graduate of Boalt Law School. She felt that Warren treated Jewish
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bootlegging and hijacking as moral issues 1  He regularly gave press
conferences and had himself photographed at high publicity trials or
smashing stills as a means of informing and educating the public. 2  He,
like Dewey, regularly addressed police organizations to emphasize the need
to professionalize local constabularies.
Warren's combination of Republicanism and partisanship was a peculiar
California Progressive type. While nominally a Republican, he refused
campaign contributions and ran for office out of his own pocket. 3 As
part of another California Progressive tradition he was a member of the anti-
Oriental Native Sons of the Golden West.' In addition to his quest for
professionalization and the general anti-graft philosophy, Warren was a
committed anti-communist and was fearful of what he saw as its strangle hold
of the California longshoremen unions.'5 Though he was the son of a
Southern Pacific day laborer and came from a background of unionism,"
Warren saw no inconsistency between his ostensible commitment to Labor
and his fervent anti-communism. 7  Unlike Dewey, anti-communist
ideology was a central tenet of Warren's prosecutorial philosophy.
In 1936, while considering a run for Attorney General, Warren embarked
on the most notorious case of his career as local prosecutor, the controversial
"Point Lobos Case."258 Point Lobos was a prosecution for the murder of
an outspoken anti-communist maritime unionist. 9  The suspects were all
associated with the Marine Fireman, Oilers, Watertenders and Wipers Union
which Warren's office believed to be a den of communist sympathizers.'
In the course of the investigation, Warren's office used extensive illegal
wiretapping, consistent with the practice of the day, and long incommunicado
interrogations of suspects. In one instance, he refused to grant a suspect a
requested lawyer.? After obtaining several convictions in the case,
Warren's tactics were severally criticized by the press and by the Demo-
assistants in the same way as other assistants. Warren exhibited no prejudices. She said with
"Warren you just never felt that he had any prejudice. Absolutely none. It may have been an
underlying thing that he didn't show, but I think he probably showed himself more liberal as a
Supreme Court Chief Justice than at any time in his life. You know, sometimes we have these
inherent attitudes that under certain circumstances we don't manifest and then when the proper
time comes we show it. And I think that's exactly what happened here."
251. G. WHITE, supra note 21, at 29-30.
252. Id. at 30-31.
253. Id. at 31.
254. Id.
255. Id. at 35-42.
256. Id. at ll.
257. Id. at 42.
258. Id. at 36.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. Id. at 38.
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crats.2 2 At one point, labor unions even picketed his home.' Warren
defended his conduct by attempting to distinguish good unionists from
Communist workers.'
In the Point Lobos case, Warren engaged in practices which his Supreme
Court would later declare unconstitutional-the use of confessions obtained
in the absence of counsel and through intimidation tactics.' Professor
White states that under the Warren Court standard, many of the Point Lobos
convictions would have been reversed.'
Warren ran for Attorney General in 1938. His blend of patriotism and
crime-busting went over well with voters, notwithstanding the opposition of
labor and civil liberties groups. Indeed, his tough stance in Point Lobos
helped him more than it hurt. As Attorney General he continued his anti-
organized crime campaign by going after gamblers whom he saw as a sign
of deep immorality in society. 7 He clashed frequently with New Deal
Governor Culbert Olsen over Olsen's attempts to pardon the Point Lobos
defendants.' Warren supported a broad ranging legislative subpoena
power to investigate communist Union affiliates and supported the Yorty
Committee investigation of communist subversives in government.
Warren had two major feuds with Olsen. The first occurred because
Warren believed his statutory role in planning civil defense matters was
ignored by Olsen. He deeply resented the snub.6 The second occurred
when Olsen nominated Radin for the California Supreme Court. Radin was
a good New Deal judicial appointment. He had supported the defendants in
Point Lobos on the grounds that their civil liberties has been compromised
by Warren's actions as prosecutor. This alone was enough for Warren to
oppose his nomination. As a member of a Commission on Judicial
Qualifications which passed on judicial appointments to the court, Warren
made, in White's words "a concerted series of efforts to keep Radin off the
court."27 Warren believed Radin's identification with left wing causes, his
support of the use of pardons, and his belief in limited legislative subpoena
262. Id. at 40.
263. Id. at 45.
264. Id. at 42.
265. Id. at 43.
266. Id. at 43-45.
267. Attorney General Warren led a spectacular gambling raid against a ship anchored n Santa
Monica harbor. The ship was beyond the three mile limit. He allowed the gamblers to keep
their ship but took the proceeds and paraphernalia of gambling and had the organized gambler
pay for the cost. See G. WHITE, supra note 21, at 50-51.
268. Id. at 55.
269. Id. at 57. Radin, an odd figure in California politics, was born in Poland, and was the
son of a rabbi. He came to California after 35 years of living in New York where he received
a B.A. from City College of New York, a law degree from New York University, and a Ph.D.
in classics from Columbia. He was a Professor at University of California at Berkeley Law
School. Radin was also one of the few legal realist scholars attracted to legal history.
270. Id. at 61.
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powers, made him unqualified to sit on the court' In addition, Warren
believed Radin was guilty of an ethical breach. Radin wrote a letter to a
friend of a judge who was sitting on a contempt case involving Radin's
daughter and testimony before the Yorty Committee. Radin asked that the
friend speak to the trial judge if the defendants were found guilty.' Radin
was also criticized by Warren for being a member of the National Lawyer's
Guild.2'
White suggested that Warren acted out of personal spite in rejecting
Radin's candidacy. Radin believed Warren acted out of a combination of
personal pique, Republican partisanship, anti-semitism, and red-hunting. It
is apparent that Warren as attorney-general, as well as local prosecutor, was
highly ideological and viewed the prosecutor's role as a defender of the
community and of anti-communist values. Dewey by contrast, did not
display such an expansive view. He was at least content to try cases within
traditional common law limits.
By far, the highlight of Warren's career as attorney general was his
involvement in national security efforts. For Warren, the chief threat to
domestic security in California was the Japanese. He was California's chief
architect in the euphemistically labeled "war relocation program."274
Warren was careful to distinguish between the threat of Japanese nationals,
as opposed to Germans and Italians. In this he was part of a larger
California tradition. His membership in the Native Sons of the Golden West
was part and parcel of a California Progressive tradition. The great Hiram
Johnson himself was a member.2 17
In his 1942 race for governor, one of Warren's chief supporters was his
old World War I companion, actor Leo Carillo, who campaigned extensively
for Warren.' While on the campaign trail for Warren, Carillo stated that
"Where's no such thing as a Japanese American... if we ever permit those
termites to stick their filthy fingers into the sacred soil of our state again, we
don't deserve to live here ourselves." 277
Warren, as Attorney General, stated shortly after Pearl Harbor that "the
Japanese situation as it exists in this state today may well be the Achilles'
heel of the entire civilian defense effort. "278 White concluded Warren "not
only participated in but can be said to have engineered one of the most
conspicuously racist and repressive governmental acts in American Histo-
271. Id.
272. Id. at 61-62.
273. Id. at 63.
274. Id. at 70.
275. Id. at 69.
276. Id. Carillo was later to gain fame in the early television series The Cisco Kid as the
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ry. "2 Warren's high profile on nativist and communist matters reflects
the different political climate of California. In New York, Dewey was more
constrained by the political acceptance of left leaning unions and ethnic
groups.
But perhaps Warren's clearest statement of his feelings about the Japanese-
Americans came in 1942 in his testimony before a visiting House Committee,
investigating the reaction to the proposed evacuation. It was clearly not the
future Supreme Court Justice's finest hour. Warren testified:
We believe that when we are dealing with the caucasian race we
have methods that will test the loyalty of them [sic] ... here we
believe that we can, in dealing with the Germans and the Italians,
arrive at some fairly sound conclusions because of our knowledge
of the same way they lived in the community and have lived for
many years. But when we deal with the Japanese we are in an
entirely different field and we cannot form any opinion that we
believe to be sound. Their method of living and their language
make for this difficulty.'
Warren went on to state that at a recent meeting of California District
Attorneys, he asked whether any had received information on subversive
activities by either Nisei or Isei Japanese.21 The answer he received was
no. Warren found this unbelievable. He told the committee:
you see, when we deal with the German aliens, when we deal
with the Italian aliens, we have many informants who are most
anxious to help the local authorities and the State and Federal
authorities to solve the alien problem.' They come in volun-
tarily and give us information. We got none from the other
source.?
In evaluating his career as public prosecutor, Warren clearly falls squarely
into the "crime control" model. Warren saw the fight against organized
crime as justifying creative, if questionable, tactics to get results. Similarly,
in the area of national security, whether dealing with communists or
Japanese, Warren displayed a marked insensitivity to due process concerns.
Warren's actions in the Radin affair are a case in point. Warren saw Radin's
articles and actions in support of communist or communist-sympathizing
defendants as being inconsistent with Warren's judicial model (which was no
279. Id. at 75.
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different than his prosecutorial model). Judges could not be soft on crime.
Warren ignored Radin's record of scholarship, liberalism, and articulation of
due process limitations on executive and legislature power. All of these traits
were seen as threats to the prosecutorial philosophy. From his actions, it is
hard to conclude other than that Warren selectively limited due process for
communists and orientals. Whenever criminal defendants appeared to have
communist sympathies, Warren pursued the prosecution as a communist
conspiracy rather than as an individual common-law prosecution.
Even more than Dewey's, Warren's conduct as a prosecutor can be best
characterized as moralistic and self-righteous. He entertained no doubt about
the scope of his prosecutorial discretion. From communists to prostitutes,
Warren saw his office as a prosecutorial machine allied against the "inter-
ests." Of considerable interest is the "moralist," patriotic element which
seemed to work against his early pro-labor sympathies. He seemed to define
communists with broad strokes. Whenever he was given a choice between
sensitivity towards labor concerns in the Point Lobos case or in the Yorty
Committee case he always opted for a broad reading of executive or
legislative powers.
In short, Warren believed the role he played as the peoples' surrogate, by
virtue of his popular election, was to articulate and emote a vigorous policy
of law enforcement. His only check seemed to be his own professional sense
of righteousness and the ballot box.
In 1931, Raymond Moley called Earl Warren "the most intelligent and
politically independent district attorney in the U.S."' Through the early
thirties, Warren's national stature rose as he was credited with creating a
model professional local office. He contributed regularly to police journals
emphasizing the need for professionalism and coordination between police
and prosecutor. However, Warren, like Dewey, still remained somewhat
distrustful of the quality and morality of the local police and was careful to
create a hand-picked district attorney's squad to handle complicated and
sensitive investigations. As Dewey had done, Warren often utilized juries
similar to Blue Ribbon jurors for these cases, applying the same rationale that
sophisticated crimes need sophisticated juries.'
By 1935, Warren had become one of the most recognized and respected
local prosecutors in the nation. When the American Bar Association held its
annual meeting in Los Angeles in 1935, the main topic of conversation was
the nation's growing crime rate. Warren was given the honor of presenting
the keynote address where he shared the podium with Dean Roscoe Pound
284. Id. at 44.
285. M. Feingold, supra note 240, at 380-87.
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and George Medalie.1 He was also formally elected as a member of
Attorney General Cumming's National Crime Council.'
Warren's speech was entitled "A State Department of Justice." 8 He
stressed his theme of the coordination between police and prosecutors and the
need for a statewide department of justice to coordinate intrastate activi-
ties? 9  The state Attorney General would head this organization. It
became a blueprint for his own rise to the position of Attorney General.?
Noticeably absent from the speech were any of the concerns expressed by
Wechsler. Beyond eliminating the third degree, police reform was largely
technocratic for Warren. Like Dewey, he believed in an educational model
and organized citizen anti-racket councils. These were similar to Dewey's
use of New York Grand Jury Associations as public forums. In both
instances, Dewey and Warren conceived of the Grand Juries as an arm of the
prosecution. Grand Jury independence was not something that ever crossed
their minds.
Perhaps the largest difference between Dewey and Warren concerned what
may be loosely labelled "political prosecutions," particularly against
communist groups. Dewey was careful never to bring a labor racket
prosecution against a union or to tie the union to political crimes. Warren
on the other hand, even though he labelled the case as a racket case, became
obsessed with politics in the Point Lobos affair. In a case built on highly
circumstantial evidence where the motive for murder may very well have
been personal rather than political, Warren chose to emphasize the political.
Though at trial he took pains to point out the "good" non-Communist
unionists from the "bad,"' Communist unionists were clearly tarred, like
the defendants, as subversives.m
Some of the differences between Warren and Dewey may be explained by
the differences between the east and west coasts. The west coast was
dominated by a radical longshoremen's labor movement. The east coast was
286. REPORT OF THE FIFrY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
(1935).
287. M. Feingold, supra note 240, at 62.
288. REPORT OF THE FIFTY-EIGHTH ANNUAL MEETING OF THE AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION,
supra note 286, at 311-32.
289. Id. at 316-17. He was careful to state that he did not favor any national system of
criminal justice. Id. at 315.
290. Id. at 311-21. Warren had long coveted the Attorney General position prior to running
for office as head of the District Attorneys association he helped encourage the legislature to
push through laws to increase its powers of supervision over state law enforcement agencies,
forbidding private practice, and increasing the salaries. All these changes were in place when
he ran and won in 1938. See J. POLLACK, EARL WARREN, THE JUDGE WHO CHANGED
AMERICA 60 (1979).
291. M. Feingold, supra note 240, at 484-85.
292. For an excellent account of radical west coast unions in the 1930s, see B. NELSON,
WORKERS ON THE WATERFRONT: SEAMAN, LONG SHOREMAN, AND UNIONISM IN THE 1930s
(1988).
43
Fleischer: Thomas E. Dewey and Earl Warren: The Rise of the Twentieth Centur
Published by CWSL Scholarly Commons, 1991
CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
dominated by organized crime. This explanation, however, does not fully
explain the obsessive zeal Warren displayed in pursuing this prosecution.
Warren's office fell just short of the third degree as illustrated by the
prolonged questioning of a sick defendant. Also, as was the common
practice of the time among district attorneys, Warren isolated the defendants
from their lawyers and delayed arraignments.' It is clear Warren was
carried away by the Point Lobos case. It became a personal crusade. For
the most part, however, his staff shifted away from physical coercion. In its
place, however, they used psychological techniques which were then
sweeping the profession.
As part of the Freudian revolution and as part of the move away from the
crude third degree, a wealth of police manuals were available instructing
officers and prosecutors how to break down suspects. By far the best were
the articles of Fred Inbau of the Chicago Police and Scientific Crime and
Detection Laboratory. Inbau's work collected in Lie Detection and Criminal
Interrogations, published in 1942, became the bible of the sophisticated
police interrogation. 2'
An example of Warren's staff in action in Point Lobos is preserved in
Miriam Feingold's excellent study of the case. 5 Alameda Assistant
District Attorney Leonard Meltzer played the role of the hardhitting "Mutt"
while ADA Ralph Lloyd was the soft "Jeff". Meltzer questioned the chief
murder suspect, union official Earl King, in the following exchange:
Q. And why do you want to talk to a lawyer?
A. Because in a serious case like this, that you are question-
ing me about, I should have legal protection.
Q. Do you need legal protection if you are innocent?
A. Sure.
Q. Would a lawyer make it any more possible for you to tell
the truth?
A. Be able to tell me what my legal rights are.
Q. You mean you want a lawyer to tell you just what facts
you can safely tell us?
A. I decline to answer that.
Q. Why? ... are you afraid to?
A. I don't know where I stand.
Q. Are you afraid to answer? As a matter of fact you and
others are guilty of murder of Alberts.
A. Not me.'
293. M. Feingold, supra note 240, at 198
294. See F. INBAU, supra note 32. Inbau, who later became a Professor of Law at Northwest-
ern, earned the title "Fred The Cop."
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As Feingold points out, this conduct was within the limits of acceptable
behavior in the taking of a confession and "reflected advanced and highly
recommended police practices."' The velvet glove had replaced the
rubber hose in the District Attorney's office of the 1930s.
Under the variegated standards of due process which prevailed in the
1930s, a confession was only deemed inadmissible if it was the product of
third degree physical abuse or if it was completely untrustworthy or
unreliable as a result of certain substantial threats or false material benefit.
Much discretion was left to state authorities. Neither Dewey nor Warren
used physical cruelty or the "bright light" technique.
Warren obtained convictions in the murder case and was catapulted to
Attorney General of California. The convictions figured prominently in his
race for Governor. When New Dealer Culbert Olsen commuted the
sentenced prisoners, Warren charged Olsen with having been influenced by
communists in his decision.2" He denounced the action and used it as a
major campaign issue against Olsen when he challenged the Governor for
being soft on crime and communists. Warren won the electionY Thus,
on the strength of his commitment and record in fighting crime, Earl Warren
became Governor of California at the age of 52.
Even more remarkably, his younger rival, Thomas E. Dewey, had become
Governor of New York in 1942.1 Dewey was special prosecutor in 1935
and New York County District Attorney in 1937. Dewey had achieved his
governorship at the age of 36 and had been seriously considered for the
Republican presidential nomination of 1940. In Dewey's valedictory address
to his staff he stated that his biggest accomplishment was the professional-
ization of his office and the model it was creating." * Dewey stated that,
"No nation was ever made good by law alone .... The pretended strength
of the government is never a substitute for the real strength of the individu-
al."' This was a sentiment that Warren could share. It had worked well
for the prosecutors. It had catapulted both to statewide and national
prominence. They were the finest examples of the twentieth century model
of professionalism. The reliance of government, as Dewey suggested, was
on good men, not necessarily laws and institutions.
Governorships were natural stepping stones in the fight against crime and
for good government. National office seemed to beckon both men and, in
a curious twist of fate, they ended up together on a dream ticket in the 1948
Presidential campaign.' It was a sort of Babe Ruth and Lou Gehrig of
297. Id. at 254.
298. Id. at 677.
299. Id. at 657-713.
300. See R. Smith, supra note 36, at 350-51.
301. Id. at 342.
302. Id.
303. Dewey was the Republican Presidential candidate for the second time and Warren was
his Vice Presidential running mate in 1948.
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liw enforcement. Unfortunately the rivalry between the two of them did not
help the campaign. It did point out how close their model came to national
achievement. The icon of Mr. District Attorney had captured the imagina-
tion of the country.
V. THE FAILURE OF THE URBAN PROSECUTOR: MIRANDA AND MAPP
Dewey was influential in the Eisenhower administration's judicial selection.
This occurred not only through his alignment with Eisenhower as part of the
eastern liberal wing of the party, but also through Eisenhower's Attorney
General Herbert Brownell who was one of Dewey's closest friends. Thus
indirectly, Dewey was responsible for the nomination of California's Warren
and New Jersey's Brennan to the Supreme Court. Dewey was to share
profound misgivings about the role of each justice. He believed both had
gone beyond the moderate agenda of reform. They had become "judicial
wreckers" who had destroyed moderate goals of the Eisenhower administra-
tion. Dewey was said to have called his one time running mate Warren "that
big dumb Swede."'
Perhaps no one decision symbolizes the leap that Earl Warren had taken
away from the Republican prosecutor model better than Miranda v.
Arizona.' In Miranda, Warren seemed to acknowledge the failure of the
Dewey-Warren prosecutor model. In the post-third degree world, the old
model became outmoded because individual good prosecutors were unable
to influence police behavior and because individual ad hoe judicial scrutiny
had failed. Finally, the new teachings of modern psychology, which came
to the conclusion that psychological coercion could be just as devastating a
device in overcoming free will as the old third degree, awoke many to the
belief that an innocent man might confess.' The old model had simply
failed.
When Warren began his Miranda opinion by stating that he was going to
decide questions which go to the "roots of our concepts of American criminal
jurisprudence...." he was not exaggerating. 7 Miranda's basic proposi-
tion was that under the Fifth Amendment, the prosecution could not use
statements, whether exculpatory or inculpatory, stemming from custodial
interrogation of the defendant unless the prosecution demonstrated the use of
procedural safeguards effective to secure the privilege?" Warren went on
to announce the most famous secular litany of the law in the twentieth
304. M. Feingold, supra note 240, at 608.
305. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
306. See R. Lifton, Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism, a study of victims of
Chinese interrogation methods in 1950's. See also Grano, Voluntariness, Free Will, and the
Law of Confessions, 65 VA. L. REV. 859 (1979).
307. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 439.
308. Id. at 444.
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century: (1) the right to remain silent; (2) any statement could be used
against the suspect; and (3) right to an attorney appointed or retained.
Warren then cited the famous Wickersham report of the early 1930s, his
generation's litmus test of fundamental fairness.' Warren outlined the
lingering instances of contemporary police brutality and suggested that it had
not yet been relegated to the past.310 He even cited a case arising out of
Dewey's successor Frank Hogan's office, the famous Wylie-Hoffet case as
a tale of police running amuck. The report was still pertinent to contem-
porary law enforcement.
Warren stressed that "the modern practice of in-custody interrogation is
psychologically rather than physically oriented." 3  To illustrate the point
he cited extensively from later editions of Inbau's manual and other police
manuals. He spoke of techniques of kindness interspersed with relentless
questioning, the "Mutt and Jeff" routine. 13  Above all there was the
suspect's sense of total isolation in the lair of the police. Most suspects, he
stated, were from minority groups or of limited intelligence. The subjuga-
tion of their will was very easy. Warren said, "To be sure this is not
physical intimidation, but is equally destructive of human dignity. "314
While Warren invited Congress and the states to supplement the Court's
Miranda litany, he saw no better minimum safeguard. He stated that "where
rights secured by the Constitution are invaded, there can be no rulemaking
or legislation which would abrogate them. "315
Warren in one fell swoop had repudiated the very tF chniques and tactics
employed by his own staff so successfully in Point Lobos and other cases.
He had also affirmed the federal judiciary above Congress and localism.
Warren had clearly changed his view about the central role of the local
prosecutor and the ability of the good prosecutor to set the example and
control his staff and police. Furthermore, Miranda demonstrated how the
seeds of professionalism sowed by Warren and Dewey had failed to grow.
Police abuse, if not rampant was still pervasive. The progressive model of
individualism and localism by example had failed.
Dewey would not accept this situation. Nor would Dewey accept the role
of the U.S. Supreme Court as the new vehicle of progress. It is to Earl
Warren's credit that in his maturity and upon reflection he was able to move
beyond the model of his youth. Warren recognized that precious rights of
autonomy could not be left to a few good men, that professionalism alone
was not enough, and that the modern age required new solutions by a
309. Id. at 447-448.
310. Id. at 455.
311. Id.
312. Id. at 448.
313. Id. at 452.
314. Id. at 457.
315. Id. at 491.
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modern progressive court. He was willing to set national standards of police
conduct.
It is equally ironic that the battle lost by the Lehman forces in the 1938
Constitutional Convention would be settled by Dewey's opposite number.
In Mapp v. Ohio,3 6 the Warren court applied the exclusionary rule to the
states' as well as the federal government?' 7 Warren's rejection of a model
of police interrogation was paralleled by his belief that professional police
conduct required the exclusionary rule be applied to the states in both search
and seizure and wiretap cases. The unfinished agenda of Lehman and
company had been completed in the works of Earl Warren.
Warren's odyssey towards Mapp shows once again the change from
Warren the prosecutor to Warren the jurist. As a prosecutor, Warren
reluctantly condoned the use of wiretaps and secret dictaphones. However,
Warren's first sign of unease with the use of "bugs" took place while he was
District Attorney and the Bakerville police were investigating the murder of
his father. One of the investigator's asked Warren for permission to place
a dictaphone in the cell of a possible suspect. Warren declined to give
permission and the cell was never bugged? 8 Nevertheless, Warren's
uneasiness with the use of taps in the case of his father's murder investiga-
tion never prompted him to issue a general edict to prevent the use of
evidence in organized crime or conspiracy cases.
In 1955, during Warren's first year on the court, he was faced with the
question of the extension of the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule to the
states in Irvine v. California."9 Irvine involved extensive police miscon-
duct through the installation of listening devices in a bookie's private home
without a warrant. The case tested the notion that illegal wiretap evidence
obtained by the police should be declared inadmissible in California? In
effect, Irvine presented the issue of whether the federal Weeks rule should be
extended to the states.32' This was the same question that the Lehmanites
raised in 1938 in the New York constitutional debate. Although Warren
went along with the majority of the court and declined to extend the rule, he
did strongly condemn the police practices. Along with Justice Jackson,
Warren took the unusual step of sending a letter to the United States
Attorney General urging prosecution of the local officers for violating
Federal Civil Rights Statutes.32
316. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
317. Id. at 655.
318. M. Feingold, supra note 240, at 778.
319. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
320. Id. at 132.
321. Id. at 135-136.
322. For a discussion of Warren's role in Irvine and of the progression of his thinking towards
Mapp, see Westin, Bookies and Buggs in California Judicial Control of Police Practices, in THE
USES OF POWER: 7 CASES IN AMERICAN POLITICs 117 (A. Westin, ed. 1962).
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By 1961, Warren's position had shifted. He abandoned the Dewey and
Cardozo approach that society would rely upon private tort actions to punish
the police. He now embraced the notion that the exclusionary rule in all its
force should apply to the states.
Mapp is nicely juxtaposed with Warren's position in Miranda. In Mapp,
Warren largely abandoned principles of federalism and rejects the notion of
prosecutor and police as self-policing mechanisms. Undoubtedly, Warren's
maturity as a judge contributed to this stance. More significantly, Warren's
sense of justice and fairness was probably sparked by the nature of the
defendants. Both defendants were ordinary individuals, not criminal moguls
or part of an organized political group. As Miranda points out, this made
the relationship between defendant and state unequal. Warren almost seems
to see the relationship between the state in the form of the police and the
individual as a type of contract of adhesion. The court had to equalize this
unfair advantage in bargaining power, knowledge, and resources.
It is clear that Warren's ability to tolerate certain forms of psychological
deception in state practices was at an end. Only a uniform rule would be fair
and just. The model prosecutor could no longer do the job of setting an
example for police.
Dewey however continued to adhere to this model and was critical of the
Warren Court. As late as 1968, he implicitly criticized the Warren Court for
extending Fifth Amendment privileges to forbid prosecutors and judges to
comment on a criminal defendant's failure to testify. 3
By the 1960s, Warren had broken free from the crime control model and
the strictures of federalism. In addition to his sense of fundamental fairness,
Warren was unwilling to wait for legislatures to reform the police process.
Warren, the preeminent prosecutor of the California police establishment,
now became the chief pariah of law enforcement.
In reading through the transcripts of police abuse, Warren more than any
other Supreme Court Justice understood and knew the tactics of police
interrogation and investigation. His sympathy for the difficult role of the
police shines through in Miranda, Mapp, and Terry v. Ohio."4 But
Warren, no longer a prosecutor, sought to enact a larger vision of due
process unrestrained by any institutional limitation. For Warren there was
no problem in allowing the court to take the lead in this reform. As both
Governor and Progressive prosecutor, Warren was never enamored of
legislatures and saw them as dens of special interests beholden to lobby
groups and narrow concerns. As a justice, Warren felt he had an open ended
agenda to reshape the American legal landscape according to the dictates of
a personal vision of fairness which coincided with American will.
While Dewey cannot be characterized as someone who believed utterly in
judicial restraint, he was not prepared to abandon the localism model of
323. Speech by Dewey, printed as Pandora's Fifth, Nat'l Rev., Dec. 17, 1968, at 1256.
324. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
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prosecutorial reform by example and models of incorruptibility. In contrast,
Warren was no longer enchanted by this ad hoc solution of his youth.
Warren's abandonment of this model in the full blossom of his maturity as
a judge became the impetus for a significant shift in the focus of American
criminal procedure away from the model of "crime control" and towards
"due process." It is this aspect of Earl Warren-the ex-prosecutor-which
sets the current debate in perspective.' It was the role of the Warren Court
to nationalize the earlier constitutional debate of New York, in its 1938
Convention.
CONCLUSION
Under the Rehnquist Court there has been a retrenchment, a further erosion
from the higher watermark of the Warren court's due process model. It is
clear however that Warren set the parameters of our current national struggle
to test the limits of due process in an era of crime control. The new "good
faith" model of the Rehnquist- Court is an ironic return to the Dewey model
of the thirties with its emphasis on self-policing. It rejects close judicial
scrutiny of police misconduct. The shadow of Thomas E. Dewey has been
resurrected in the judicial philosophy of our current Supreme Court.
325. See Smith, Police Professionalism and the Right of Criminal Defendants, 26 CRIM. L.
BuLL. 155 (1990) for an interesting argument that Warren and his judicial brethren were
generationally committed to judicial reform of the police based on their shared memory of the
Wickersham Report and the police brutality of their youth, which led them to judicially enforced
professionalism as opposed to a younger generation of judges which lacked such historical
memory and were more committed to self-policing.
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